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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment poses a dicult practical problem: It is quite
short and does not explain what counts as speech, what counts as freedom, or
what counts as abridging. To ll the chasm between the broad rule and its
application to specic cases, a great deal of thinking has to be done. 2
On August 7, 1995, President Clinton announced a sweeping Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) proposal designed to reduce roughly by half
children's and adolescents' use of tobacco products.3 If adopted, the rules would
dramatically alter the labeling, sale, distribution, and advertising of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco in this country.4 A suit led by the tobacco industry
in federal court in North Carolina makes numerous jurisdictional, statutory,
1 This tide derives from a famous exchange between Chief Justice Rehuquist and Justice
Brennan in their respective opinions in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Com-
pany of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehaquist
argued that lilt would... surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to
the legislature the authority to totally ban [casino gambling], but deny to the legislature the
authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for [such gambling] through advertising. Id. at
346. Justice Brennan's replied in his stinging dissent that the constitutional doctrine' which
bans Puerto Rico from banning advertisements concerning lawful casino gambling is not so
strange a restraint{ it is called the First Amendment. Id. at 355 n. 4 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The vitality of Rehnquist's greater power includes the lesser reasoning is discussed infra
part III.B.2.b.
2Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 747, 748 (1993).
3FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995)(to be codied at 21 C.F.R.
Pt. 897). The FDA, adopting an objective of the 1990 Department of Health and Human
Services Healthy People 2000 report, intends to reduce by roughly half the number of young
Americans who smoke within seven years of the date of publication of the nal rule. Id.
41d. at 41,321.
1and constitutional claims that threaten to render the proposal dead on arrival.5
This paper examines the First Amendment issues created by the FDA's un-
precedented proposal to restrict tobacco advertising aimed at children and to
compel manufacturers to establish and maintain a public education campaign.
The FDA's proposed advertising restrictions, described in greater
detail infra part II, would ban outdoor advertising for tobacco products within a
specied distance of schools and playgrounds; require print advertising to be in
black and white text-only format except in publications with a suciently high
adult readership; ban the sale or distribution of promotional items containing
the name or logo of branded non-tobacco items; and prohibit brand sponsorship
of events such as concerts and auto races. The FDA also proposes to require
manufacturers to establish and maintain a national public education campaign
aimed at children and adolescents to counter the pervasive imagery and reduce
the appeal created by decades of pro-tobacco messages.6
The FDA argues that these regulations will signicantly decrease
the amount of positive imagery that makes [cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products] so appealing to young people,7 and thus will signicantly decrease the
number of young people who begin smoking. According to existing evidence,
however, it is uncertain whether advertising restrictions actually decrease to-
bacco use among young people{ indeed, as discussed infra part IV, no consen-
5Six of the nation's largest cigarette and smokeless tobacco product manufacturers sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the FDA and its commissioner, David A. Kessler,
M.D., in federal court in North Carolina. One company, the Liggett Group, has since an-
nounced its withdrawal from the litigation as part of a settlement of an unrelated class action
suit. See Bamaby J. Feder, A United Front By Big Tobacco Starts to Crack, N.Y. TIMEs,
March i4~ 1996, at Al
6FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314.
7Id.
2sus emerges from statistical and anecdotal data as to whether such restrictions
would have any eect at all. This uncertainty results in the two questions that
are the subject of this paper: (1) do the FDA's proposed rules survive First
Amendment scrutiny? and (2) should they?
The FDA addresses these questions in the commentary that accom-
panies the proposed rules, but its legal analysis is wholly unsatisfactory. The
constitutionality of most{ but not all{ of these proposed rules hinges on the ap-
plication of the commercial speech doctrine.8 Commercial speech jurisprudence
has been among the most unsettled and unpredictable areas of First Amend-
ment law since the seminal case of Virginia State Board of Phannacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.9 The Supreme Court's eorts to dene the
category of commercial speech, to scrutinize government attempts to regulate
it, and to justify its decisions by reference to First Amendment theory and
values have been inconsistent and, at times, irreconcilable. The FDA invoked
one strain of this jurisprudence to conclude that its proposed rules could easily
withstand a First Amendment challenge, but failed even to mention, much less
respond to, the strong arguments, based on both theory and recent precedent,
that the tobacco lobby10 might make in response.
This paper attempts a much more thorough analysis of the First
Amendment issues raised by the proposed rules. Such analysis reveals fatal
8Commercial speech is one of the so-called low-value categories of speech not protected to
the full extent of the First Amendment. See Jerey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value
Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297, 317 (1995).
9~ U.S. 74x (1~7~).
10For the sake of uniformity and simplicity, I will refer to the parties that oppose the FDA's
proposed regulations collectively as the tobacco lobby, although some groups may have no
economic stake in the health of the tobacco industry and have other reasons for ~ the
3constitutional defects with at least one aspect of the proposal, concludes that
the remaining restrictions present much closer constitutional questions than
the FDA acknowledges, and argues that the proposal as a whole is dicult to
reconcile with a coherent theory of the First Amendment. Towards these ends,
I take the following approach. Part II describes the youth tobacco use crisis in
this country and presents in greater detail the FDA's proposed rules. Part III
summarizes the relevant commercial speech principles, including the denition
of commercial speech, the First Amendment values served by protecting or not
protecting it to the full extent of the Constitution, and the various tests the
Supreme Court has used to scrutinize government attempts to regulate such
speech. Part IV applies these principles to the FDA proposal, draws conclusions
as to its constitutionality, and argues that the proposal contradicts fundamental
First Amendment principles. Part V oers some concluding observations and
suggests an alternative approach to restricting speech. h~i1k~ncina
II. YOUTH, TOBACCO, AND THE FDA PROPOSAL
A. Youth Tobacco Use in the United States
My grandfather smoked his rst cigarette when he was nine years
old. According to my grandmother, he and his friends would sneak into the
alleyways behind their southwest Philadelphia homes and smoke the cigarettes
that they had pilfered from their fathers and bought with the money made
shining shoes. He continued to smoke for the next fty years until, remarkably,
he was able to quit in the late 1960's. Nonetheless, my grandfather contracted
lung cancer and died in 1980 of a heart condition that was aggravated by lung
4removal surgery made necessary by the cancer. What caused him to begin
smoking will forever remain a mystery. My grandmother blames the bad kids
that he fell in with in the neighborhood{ as she says, they smoked, so he started
too. What is not a mystery is that his story is typical of millions of stories since.
The number of American young people who use tobacco prod-
ucts is staggering. Currently, more than three million American adolescents
smoke cigarettes and an additional one million adolescent males use smokeless
tobacco.11 The vast majority of the fty million American smokers began smok-
ing as children or adolescents.12 Studies suggest that the younger one begins
to smoke, the more likely one is to become a heavy smoker, 13 while those that
have not begun smoking by age eighteen are unlikely ever to do so.14
Widespread tobacco use by young people has taken a disastrous toll
on the nation's health. Researchers estimate that 400,000 people die each year
from smoking related illnesses15 and numerous studies have established causal
11DEPARTMENT OF HEALTh AND HuMAN SERvICES, Preventing Tobacco Use Among
Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General, Atlanta, Georgia: DHIIS, PHS, CDC,
NCCDPHP, OSH, 1994, at 5, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314 (hereinafter
cited as 1994 SGR). According to a 1994 Institute of Medicine Report, approximately 3000
young people per day become regular smokers. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Growing Up
Tobacco Free, 1994, at 8, reprinted in FDA Proposal at 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314 (hereinafter
JOM). A 1990 study estimated that adolescents consume 947 million packs of cigarettes and 26
million containers of smokeless tobacco and account for annual tobacco sales of $1.26 billion.
DiFranza, J.R. and J.B. Tye, Who Prots From Tobacco Sales to Children? JOURNAL OF
ThE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsocIATION, vol. 263, No. 20, 1990, at 2784-2787, reprinted
in FDA Proposal. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41.317.
12According to the Surgeon General's Report, eighty-two percent of adults who ever smoked
had their rst cigarette before age 18. 1994 SGR, supra note 10, at 65, reprinted in FDA
Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at41314;
13E. Taioli and E.L. Wynder, Eect of the Age at Which Smoking Begins on Frequency of
Smoking in Adulthood, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, vol. 325, No.
13, 1991, at 968-969, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314; L.G. Escobedo,
et al., Sports Participation, Age of Smoking Initiation, and the Risk of Smoking Among U.S.
High School Students, JOURNAL OF THE AMEPJCAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, vol.
269, No. 11, 1993, at 1391-1395, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at41,314.
141994 SGR, supra note 10, at 5, 58, 65-67. reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at
41,314.
15J.M. McGinnis and W.H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, JOURNAL
5links between smoking and cancer, heart disease, and stroke.16 Studies show
that a person whose tobacco use begins in adolescence and continues over his or
her lifetime faces a fty percent risk of dying prematurely as a direct result.17
Further, the earlier a person's habit begins, the greater the risk of developing
smoking-related diseases.18 Smokeless tobacco's links to various forms of oral
cancer have been well-documented,19 and, as with cigarettes, the longer the
exposure to smokeless tobacco products, the greater the risk of contracting
cancer.20
Perhaps most alarming is that adolescent tobacco use is on the rise.
Even while smoking rates have declined for most segments of the American adult
population in the past few decades, the number of young smokers is increasing.21
According to studies cited by the FDA,
Between 1991 and 1994, the prevalence of smoking by eighth graders
increased 30 percent, from 14.3 percent to 18.6 percent. Among 10th grade
OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, vol. 270, No. 18. 1993, at 2207-2212,
reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,318. As Dr. David Kessler, Commissioner of
the FDA, recently told an audience at Georgetown University, smoking kills more people each
year in the United States than AIDS, highway accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs,
suicide, and res combined. FEDERAL NEws SERVICE, August 16, 1995.
16See FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,318 and un. 34 - 39.
17Peto, et. al., Mortality From Smoking in Developing Countries, 1950-2000. Indirect
Estimates from National Vital Statistics, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994, at
AIO, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,318.
18Taioli and Wynder, supra note 12, at 968-969. reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg.
at 41.3 18; Escobedo, et al., supra note 12, at 1391-1395, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 41,318.
191994 SGR, supra note 10, at 39, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,319.
20Department of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of Using Smokeless
Tobacco: A Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General. Bethesda, Md.,
DHHS, PHS, DHHS, PHS, NIH Publication No. 86-2874, 1986, 33-47, reprinted in FDA
Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,319.
21THE UNIvERsrrY OF MICHIGAN, NEWS AND INFORMATION SERVICE, July 20,
1995, Smoking rates climb among American teenagers, who nd smoking increasingly socially
acceptable and seriously underestimate the risks, Table 1, reprinted in FDA Proposal, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 41,317. See also FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41.315 and n. 17.
6students, it increased from 20.8 percent to 25.4 percent and for 12th grade
students, it rose from 28.3 percent to 31.2 percent. Between 1985 and 1994,
smoking among college freshmen increased from 9 percent to12.5percent.22
Another study, completed in 1995, found that smoking rates among
13- and 14-year-olds had increased thirty percent in the three previous years
alone.23
B. The Food and Drug Administration's Proposed Restrictions
It is against this backdrop of alarmingly high and steadily rising
rates of tobacco use among young people, and the grave health consequences
of such use, that the Food and Drug Administration proposed its rules. The
proposal reects a scientic judgment that nicotine addiction should be treated
as a pediatric disease and the attendant policy judgment that the FDA's lim-
ited resources should be focused on tobacco use by children and adolescents.24
Rather than banning tobacco products for the millions of Americans who are
currently addicted to them, this regulation focuses on preventing future gen-
erations from developing an addiction to nicotine-containing tobacco products.
25 Towards this end, the FDA conducted extensive research, consulted health
ocials in this country and throughout the world,26 and developed a strategy
whose two primary components are (1) restricting the sale and distribution of
tobacco products to young people, and (2) reducing the appeal of such prod-
22FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,315 (citations omitted).
23The MacNei/Lehrer NewsHour, August 10, 1995.
241d at 41,314
25Id.
26The FDA credited numerous resources, including the World Health Organization, the
Oce of the Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National
Cancer Institute, and the Institute of Medicine. Id. at 41,315.
7ucts by restricting tobacco advertising and increasing public awareness of the
dangers of tobacco use. This paper concerns the second category of regulations.
The FDA proposes that the following rules be included in new part
897 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations:
* Educational Programs Concerning Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco Products. Proposed 21 C.F.R. x897.29 would require each manufacturer
to establish and maintain a national public educational program, including ma-
jor reliance on television messages, to combat the eects of the pervasive and
positive imagery that has for decades helped to foster a youth market for to-
bacco products.27 This section would require each manufacturer to devote an
amount of money to the corrective educational program proportionate to its
share of the total advertising and promotional expenditures of the industry as
a whole.28 The rule would further require that the industry members to select
from a variety of messages maintained by FDA... [which] would determine which
messages are appropriate in consultation with [other government agencies]. 29
Manufacturers would also have to report to the FDA on the eectiveness of the
program.
*Outdoor advertising. Proposed 21 C.F.R. x897.30(b) would pro-
hibit outdoor advertising of tobacco products from appearing outside of build-
ings within 1.000 feet of an elementary or secondary school or playground. 30
* Black and white, text-only (tombstone') advertising. Proposed
27id. at 41,327.
281d at 41.328.
29Id. at 4 1.327-328.
30ld. at 41,334.
821 C.F.R. x897.32(a-b) would require that permissible print advertising of to-
bacco products be in black and white, text-only form in all publications that
do not have a primarily adult readership. A publication has a primarily adult
readership if (a) [its] readers age 18 or older constitute 85 percent or more of
[its] total readership, or (b) [it] is read by two million or fewer people under age
18, whichever method results in the lower number of young people. 31
* Branded non-tobacco items and sponsorship Proposed 21 C.F.R.
x897.34(a) would prohibit the sale or distribution of all non-tobacco items that
are identied with a cigarette or smokeless tobacco product brand name or other
identifying characteristic; x897.34(b) would prohibit all proof of purchase sales
or gifts of non-tobacco items as well as all contests, lotteries, games of chance
that are linked to the purchase of, or in consideration for the purchase of a
tobacco product; and x897.34(c) would further prohibit a sponsored event from
being identied with a cigarette or smokeless tobacco product brand name or
any other brand identifying characteristic. Sponsorship would be permitted in
corporate name only, and that corporate name must have been in existence on
January 1, 1995.32
The sweeping scope of these proposed rules is apparent from their
description.
While tobacco advertising is already subject to some legal restric-
311d. at 41,335.
32Id. at 41,336.
9tions33 and is further limited by voluntary industry codes,34 the proposed rules
go so far beyond existing restrictions that the tobacco lobby argues that they
would be tantamount to a ban of all tobacco advertising and promotion.35 As
draconian as these measures appear at rst glance, they may yet be consistent
with the guarantees of the First Amendment. The next section summarizes the
First Amendment principles and doctrine that govern the constitutionality of
the FDA's proposed rules.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: DEFINITION, THEORY, AND DOC-
TRINE
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that
the Constitution imposes no... restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising.36 The Court oered no further explanation of its decision,
and apparently considered it quite an easy case.37 After years of criticism of
the casual and almost ohand nature of this decision,38 and considerable erosion
33For example, federal laws forbidding television and radio advertising of tobacco products
were upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), ad
per curiam, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
34The Cigarette Advertising and Promotion Code (CAPC) includes guidelines intended to
ensure that advertising be placed in adult-oriented media and appeal only to adults, and that
minors not participate in promotional oers and contests. Both the CAPC and the Outdoor
Advertising Association of America's Code of Advertising Practices call for a distance of
500 feet from established schools and playgrounds for the placement of tobacco billboards.
See Leo Burnett, Inc., Comments from the Leo Burnett Company, Inc. To the Food and
Drug Administration on Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, Docket No. 95N-0253,
December 1995, 4 (hereinafter Leo Burnett).
35Id. at 46.
36Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1952) (upholding a New York ban on distribut-
ing commercial handbills).
37Kozinski and Banner, supra note 1, at 757, claim that Valentine was one of the easiest
cases the Court ever decided. The Court decided the case four days after oral argument and
announced its opinion nine days later{ a time frame not unheard of in those days, but about
as fast as any case was ever decided. Id. The case was not one any of the Justices found
necessary to dwell upon. Id.
38Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
10of the holding,39 the Supreme Court reversed itself in the landmark 1976 case
of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.40 In Virginia Board, the Court overturned a state prohibition of com-
mercial drug price advertising, declaring unmistakably that commercial speech
is protected by the First Amendment,41 though not to its full extent.42 In
dicta, the Court explained that some forms of commercial speech regulation are
surely permissible, but left for another day a description of these forms. Courts,
lawyers, commentators, and business people have wrestled with this question
ever since. Professor Schauer noted in 1988 that almost all of the foundational
questions about rst amendment protection for commercial speech remain on
the table for consideration and reconsideration. 43 While this may be less
true in 1996 than it was in 1988, important questions that directly bear on the
constitutionality of the FDA's proposed restrictions remain unresolved today.
A.. What is commercial speech?
The rst appearance of the phrase commercial speech in a judicial
opinion occurred in a 1971 decision of the D.C. Circuit.44 The Supreme Court
39See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from carrying sex designated
advertising columns); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975)(speech is not stripped
of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in [commercial advertisements]).
See also Steven M. Simpson, Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Analysis of the
Consequences of Basing First Amendment Protections on the 'Public Interest, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 575 (1994).
40425 U.S. 748 (1976).
41The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42425 U.S. at 773.
43Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56
U. CtN. L. REv. 1181, 1182(1988).
44Kozinski and Banner, supra note 1, at 756. Judge Skelly Wright noted that [ciommercial
advertising{indeed, any sort of commercial speech{ is less fully protected than other speech,
because it generally does not communicate ideas and thus is not directly related to the central
purpose of the First Amendment. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC.
450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., CBS. inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
11adopted the term two years later in Pittsburgh Press{ describing Valentine as the
origin of the commercial-speech doctrine45{ and has used the term ever since.46
The Court has been less consistent, however, in how it has dened what speech
counts as commercial for purposes of the First Amendment.47 A clear denition
has been elusive because a coherent justication for distinguishing commercial
from non-commercial speech has never been made entirely clear, as will be
demonstrated in the following section. Because the reason for a distinction
determines its bounds, the question becomes how to dene the latter without
the former.
The Court has most frequently dened commercial speech as speech
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction, 48 but has dropped
the does no more in recent cases.49 Examples of speech categorized as commer-
cial under this denition include print and broadcast advertising,50 face-to-face
and direct mail solicitation,51 and tupperware parties.52 In Cincinnati v. Dis-
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
45Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 384.
46Kozinski and Banner, supra note 1. at 756.
47Numerous commentators have noted the Court's failure to draw a principled distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech. See. e.g., Jerey M. Shaman, supra note
7, at 317; R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial
Speech, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 137, 157-58 (1994); David F. McGowan, Comment,
A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALif. L. REv. 359, 383-85 (1990); Schauer,
supra note 42, at 1185 n. 17. Even the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the precise
bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial speech are uncertain.
Zauderer v. Oce of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 636
(1985).
48See, e.g., Posadas. 478 U.S. at 340; Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 762.
49Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585. 1589 (1995)(noting that litigants agreed
that alcohol beverage advertising is commercial speech); United States v. Edge Broadcasting,
113 S.Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993)(holding that lottery advertising is commercial speech); Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989)(holding that
tupperware parties at issue were commercial speech).
50See, e.g., Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340 (casino gambling advertising); Virginia Board, 425
U.S. at 762 (drug price advertising).
51Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995)(direct mail solicitation by lawyers);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (in person solicitation by lawyers).
52Fox, 492 U.S. at 473.
12covery Network, Inc., the Court described these forms of speech as core com-
mercial speech, but implied that other forms of speech may nonetheless qualify
for the lower level of protection described infra part III.C.53 Discovery Net-
work concerned an ordinance that regulated the distribution of free magazines,
published nine times per year, containing advertisements for educational, recre-
ational, and social programs in the area, but also including some information
about current events of general interest.54 The Court noted that many of these
publications could not be categorized as core commercial speech, but assumed
for the purposes of that decision that they should all be treated as such.55
The Supreme Court acknowledges that the precise bounds of the
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech are uncertain,56
and has provided relatively few clues as to how the outer margins of the category
might be identied. The Court oered a potentially expansive denition in the
critical 1980 decision of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission57{expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience58{ but has never adopted it.59 Three years later,
the Court faced the issue of whether informational pamphlets discussing the
desirability of prophylactics in general or [respondent's] products in particular
53Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1513 (1993).
54Id. at 1508.
55 Id. at 1514.
56 Zauderer v. Oce of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 636 (1985).
57447 U.S. 557 (1980)(categorizing advertising by utility companies promoting electricity
use as commercial speech).
581d. at 561.
59See Discovery Network, 113 S.Ct. at 1513 (discussing the Central Hudson denition but
declining to use it).
13should be categorized as commercial speech.60 The Court considered three
factors{ whether (1) the speech in question was an advertisement, (2) mentioned
a specic product by name, and (3) the speaker had an economic motivation for
speaking.61 The Court held that the combination of all three factors in the case
supported the conclusion that the expression was commercial, but was careful
to note that the mere presence of any one factor does not compel the conclusion
that speech is commercial.62
Whether a court regards speech as either commercial or non-commercial
is not merely word-play. The characterization dictates whether a court applies
intermediate scrutiny to a government regulation challenged in a particular case,
or subjects the law to far more searching review. Indeed, the dierence can be
outcome determinative. Thus, the constitutionality of the FDA's proposed re-
strictions will hinge in large part on how the regulated speech is dened.
The FDA proposal would regulate some expression clearly included
in the core commercial speech described in Discovery Network, but would also
extend to speech at the margins of the category. The tobacco and advertising
industries will most likely have to concede that the proposed outdoor advertis-
ing and black and white, text-only restrictions regulate commercial speech. The
Supreme Court has squarely held that advertising pure and simple falls within
the category of commercial speech.63 The proposed bans on branded sponsor-
60 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.. 463 U.S. 60. 66-67 (1983)
61Id. at 66-67.
62Id. at 66. Speech is not commercial merely because money is spent to project it; because
it is in a form sold for prot; because it solicits money; or, because it regards a commercial
subject. Alex Kozinshi and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REv. 627, 638 (1990)). See also Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 761; Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1512 (1993).
63Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636.
14ship and promotional items may present slightly closer questions, however, and
the industry-funded anti-smoking campaign pushes the very outer limits of the
category, if not beyond.64 These regulations implicate both the denitional am-
biguity and the underlying uncertainty as to the First Amendment values that
justify the commercial! non-commercial distinction in the rst place.
B.Why should the First Amendment protect commercial speech
dierently than it protects non-commercial speech?
1.Theories of the First Amendment
Although the language of the First Amendment suggests no dis-
tinction between dierent categories of speech, the Court has never adopted the
absolutist position advocated by Justice Hugo Black.65 Rather, the Court has
taken the view that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance66{
that, because certain types of speech have less value than others, they are not
entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.67 Such line-drawing
presupposes an overarching theory of the First Amendment that renders the
categories of speech inconsistent with these values readily identiable. Yet no
one theory has ever been espoused by the court, due largely to the fact that [tihe
framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to
64See, e.g.. Discovery Network, 113 S.Ct. at 1512 ('[TIhe speech whose content deprives it
of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject. No one would contend that
lal pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of whether, in general, phar-
maceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement forbidden.' )(quoting Virginia
Board, 425 U.S. at 761-62 (1976)).
65Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959)(Black, I., concurring)(I read 'no law..,
abridging' to mean no law abridging.)
66Dun & Bradatreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
67See generally Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (1989);
Shaman, supra note 7. Other categories of low value speech include obscenity, libel, and
ghting words.
15have been overly concerned with the subject. 68 Instead, three major theories
of the First Amendment have emerged over time, each achieving some degree of
recognition on the Court, each useful to some degree as a guiding principle for
when to protect speech and when not to.
The oldest justication69 for free speech is that it is the essential
instrument for the discovery of truth in the marketplace of ideas. 70 The
argument begins with the premise, as described by noted First Amendment
scholar Thomas Emerson, that the soundest and most rational judgment is
arrived at by considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth in
behalf of or against any proposition.... lAin individual who seeks knowledge
and truth must hear all sides of the question, especially as presented by those
who feel strongly and argue militantly for a dierent view.71
Under this theory, the First Amendment prohibits government at-
tempts to suppress information that contributes to the search for truth, no
matter how certainly true an accepted position may seem to be, 72 no matter
how unaccepted the contrary position.73
[S]uppression of information, discussion, or the clash of opinion
68Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1,
22 (1971).
69John H. Garvey and Frederick Schauer, eds., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER
58 (1992). See John Milton, AREOPAGITICA (1644)(let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?)
70This now-familiar phrase was coined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919)(the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market).
71Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 881 (1963).
72ld.
73John Stuart Mill, ON LtBERTY (18 59)(If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and
only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justied in silencing
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justied in silencing mankind.)
16prevents one from reaching the most rational judgment, blocks the generation of
new ideas, and tends to perpetuate error... The only justication for suppressing
an opinion is that those who seek to suppress it are infallible in their judgment
of the truth. But no individual or group can be infallible, particularly in a
constantly changing world.74
Presumably, this theory implies no hierarchy of truths. Speech that
leads to the discovery of any truth{ regardless of how mundane or profound{
is protected. Only speech that in no way contributes towards a search for any
truth, that can not possibly be the basis of any rational opinion, would be left
unprotected by this theory.
A second proposition, equally broad in scope, equally indebted to
the Enlightenment for its origins, is that the First Amendment fundamentally
serves the value of individual liberty.75 Again, Professor Emerson explains this
individual self-realization or self-fulllment theory most lucidly. He writes that
[i]t derives from the widely accepted premise of Western thought
that the proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities
as a human being. Man is distinguished from other animals principally by the
qualities of his mind.... It is through development of these powers that man
nds his meaning and place in the world... From this it follows that every man{
in the development of his own personality{ has the right to form his own beliefs
and opinions.... [, and to express them].... Hence suppression of belief, opinion,
74Emerson, supra note 70, at 88 1-82.
75See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964(1978); Martin H. Redish. The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.PA. L.REv.
591 (1982).
17and expression is an aront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential
nature.76
Thus, the First Amendment ensures that the government fullls its
purpose of promoting the welfare of the individual by prohibiting interferences
with personal expression. Whether the expression is judged to promote good or
evil, justice or injustice, equality or inequality77 is irrelevant to its value under
the First Amendment. So long as speech furthers individual self-realization,
this theory holds it protected. This second theory is arguably broader in scope
than the rst, and, indeed, can be attacked on the grounds that it provides no
limiting principle.
The third major theory holds a far narrower range of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. According to the argument espoused most
prominently by Robert Bork78 and Alexander Meiklejohn,79 the First Amend-
ment is an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.80 As
Garvey and Schauer explain,
[t]he argument from democratic theory for a free speech principle
rests on the assumption of popular sovereignty. If the people are going to exercise
their sovereign power intelligently they need to be well-informed, and to debate
before deciding.81
76Emerson, supra note 70. at 879.
77Id. at 880.
78Bork, supra note 67, at 20 (Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech
that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form
of expression. ).
79See Alexander Meiklejohn. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
80Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 765.
81Garvey and Schauer. supra note 68, at 100.
18Meiklejohn argues that the First Amendment condemns with its
absolute disapproval any suppression of ideas about the common good. 82 Of
course, how broadly one denes the common good determines the breadth of the
First Amendment's protection under this theory, which can be understood as a
limited form of the marketplace of ideas argument{ one that values the political
marketplace to the exclusion of all others. Democratic free speech theorists
argue that theirs is the only possible reading true to originalist intent.83
2.Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory
The Court has held on numerous occasions that commercial speech
must be distinguished from speech at the First Amendment's core. 84
Commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, com-
mensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
and is subject to modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm
of noncommercial expression.85
While the Court has clearly explained the theoretical underpin-
nings of including commercial speech within the First Amendment's sphere, its
reasons for providing merely a limited degree of protection have been decidedly
unconvincing. a.Why should the First Amendment protect commercial speech
at all?
The Supreme Court justies protection of commercial speech pri-
marily by reference to the marketplace of ideas theory. In Virginia Board, the
82Meikejohn, POLrHCAL FREEDOM, at 28.
83See Kozinski and Banner. supra note 61. at 631.
84Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371. 2375 (1995).
85Id.
19Court, per Justice Blackmun, held that bringing speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction within the bounds of protected expression
serves individual and societal interests in the free ow of commercial informa-
tion. 86 A particular consumer has a strong interest in the information that will
allow him or her to make informed, rational decisions about how to spend his
or her money. Indeed, as the Court noted, an individual's interest in such infor-
mation may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate. 87 Moreover, individual consumers making informed
decisions produce, in the aggregate, a net societal benet. As the Virginia Board
Court noted,
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. To this end, the free ow of
commercial information is indispensable.88
The Court rearmed this reasoning just last term in Rubin: the
free ow of commercial information is 'indispensable to the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system' because it informs the numerous private
decisions that drive the system. 89 b.Why should commercial speech not be
86Virginia Board. 425 U.S. at 763-64.
87Id. at 763; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995)(quoting same).
88425 U.S. at 765.
89115 S.Ct. at 1589 (quoting Virginia Board). The Court has also contended that demo-
cratic free speech theory justies according commercial speech a degree of First Amendment
protection, albeit indirectly. As the Court stated in Virginia Board,
if Ithe free ow on commercial information] is indispensable to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking
20protected to the full extent of the First Amendment?
The Court's attempts to justify granting only a limited degree of
protection to commercial speech begin with Virginia Board's famous footnote
24. In this note, the Court reasons that there are commonsense dierences be-
tween speech that 'does no more than propose a commercial transaction,'... and
other varieties.., that suggest that a dierent degree of protection is necessary to
insure that the ow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unim-
paired. 90 The Court identies two such dierences{ the greater objectivity
and hardiness of commercial speech91{ and describes them as follows:
[First, t]he truth of commercial speech... may be more easily veri-
able by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary,
in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a spe-
cic product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than
other kinds. Since advertising is the Sine qua non of commercial prots, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.92
This reasoning is highly questionable as an empirical matter, and
utterly inadequate as constitutional analysis. First, as Kozinski and Banner
persuasively argue, the veriability analysis has no application to the image-
based advertising that comprises much of today's commercial speech.93 Take
in a democracy, we could not say that the free ow of information does not serve that goal.
425 U.S. at 765 (footnote omitted). This justication was clearly secondary to the
marketplace reasoning, however, and has not been relied on since.
90425 U.S. at 771 n. 24.
91Id.
92Id.
93Kozinski & Banner, supra note 61, at 635.
21such slogans as Coke is it! or There's something about an Aqua Velva man or
You and Betty Crocker can bake someone happy. It is unclear what claims are
being made, much less how one would go about trying to verify them. Further,
as Kozinski and Banner contend, other more objective and therefore veriable
forms of speech, such as scientic literature, do not suer less protection as
a result.94 Last, one could argue just as plausibly that the more objective
a category of speech, the less justication for government regulation, because
such speech is more easily refuted by counterspeech.95
The hardiness justication is equally unconvincing. According ex-
pression a degree of protection inversely proportional to the strength of the
motive for expressing it has no basis in First Amendment theory{ indeed, it
runs directly counter to the notion of individual self-realization described above.
Second, the Court provides no empirical support for the proposition that the
prot motive is stronger than other motives for speaking.96 What about speech
motivated by romantic love? By religious fervor? Would similar reasoning sup-
port a lower standard for government attempts to regulate such forms of speech
as these?
Remarkably, the Court has never questioned these justications
for a lesser degree of First Amendment protection. In recent years, however,
the Court has generally moved away from referring to them{ save for boiler-
plate references to the commonsense dierences between commercial and non-
94id.
95Id. at 636.
96Id. at 637.
22commercial speech97{ and relied instead on two additional explanations of the
subordinate position of commercial speech.
First, the Court has argued that '[t]o require a parity of constitu-
tional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee
with respect to the latter kind of speech.98 A response to this argument is di-
cult to formulate simply because the position has never been fully explained or
substantiated. But the contention most likely starts with the premise that gov-
ernments must have the ability to regulate certain forms of commercial speech{
consumer fraud and securities regulation, for example{ in the interests of a
healthy economy.99 Courts would have to uphold such regulations against First
Amendment challenges. If the First Amendment were held to protect commer-
cial and noncommercial speech equally, and the protection was weakened in
order to permit legislatures to enact important economic laws, the protection
granted other forms of speech would also suer. Yet, as Kozinski and Banner
once again argue, it is unclear why the basic content-neutral analysis that is
applied to non-commercial speech would not permit legislatures from criminal-
izing consumer and securities fraud, for example, without diluting the freedom
of speech generally.100 So long as such laws serve an important government
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the restriction is no
97See, e.g., Discovery Network, 113 5. Ct. at 1513; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n. 6;
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506.
98Florida Bar, 115 S.Ct. at 2375 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978)). See also Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480 (l989)(quoting same).
99Kozinsld and Banner, supra note 61, at 651.
100Id.
23greater than necessary, a court does not need intermediate scrutiny to uphold
them against constitutional challenges.101 Kozinski and Banner argue that, at
most, minor statutory modications may be required, and they cite libel as
an example of expression brought within the realm of the First Amendment
without the dire consequences predicted. 102
We are left with the argument that lies at the heart of the distinc-
tion between commercial and non-commercial speech. The Court has argued
that commercial speech is 'linked inextricably' with the commercial transaction
it proposes... so that the State's interest in regulating this underlying trans-
action may give it a concomitant interest in the expression itself. 103 The
argument is not one based on the speaker's motive{ the Court has frequently
noted that speech motivated purely by prot may nonetheless be entitled to
full First Amendment protection104{ but on the content of the speech itself.
The protection enjoyed by speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction is mitigated by the state's power to regulate the transaction pro-
posed. Carry this argument to its logical conclusion, of course, and one nds
that state power to make certain products or services illegal would eliminate all
First Amendment protection of the speech that proposes them.
This logical conclusion was, in fact, the law of the land very re-
cently. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto
101Id.
102Id.
103Edeneld v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1797 (1993)(quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
10 n. 9 (1979))(foornote omitted).
104See, e.g., Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 761.
24Rico,105 the Court upheld a
Puerto Rican prohibition of casino gambling advertising aimed at
the island's residents. The Court held that it is precisely because the government
could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct [casino
gambling] that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive
step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demands through advertising.
106 The greater power includes the lesser107 reasoning of Posadas inspired a
torrent of criticism,108 yet remained nominally viable authority until nally
relegated to dicta status last term in Rubin.109 The inextricably intertwined
and concomitant interest language cited above suggests very strongly, however,
that a more limited form of the Posadas reasoning{ the greater power aects the
lesser, perhaps{ persists as an important justication for treating commercial
speech as a second-class citizen of First Amendment doctrine. Yet the Court
has never made clear why one government power inuences another distinct and
fundamentally dierent power, and to what extent. Until the Court explains
105478 U.S. 328 (1986).
106Id. at 346.
107Even the mere phrase the greater power includes the lesser is a dangerous form of legal
reasoning because it assumes the very judgment in question. When speaking about a particular
good or service, the power to ban it is certainly greater than the power to ban advertising
for it. In a more general sense, however, state economic and regulatory authority is simply a
dierent power{ not greater and perhaps even lesser{ than its very limited power to suppress
speech.
108See Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separa-
bility Approach. 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 371, 382 n. 76 (citing numerous law review arti-
cles criticizing the Posadas decision). See also, Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and
Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REv. 289. 290-91
(1987)(Posadas mocks the constitutional status of commercial speech); Albert P. Mauro, Jr.,
Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermedi-
ate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1968 (1992)(Justice Rehnquist's greater-lesser
power argument expressed in Posadas negates all protection for commercial speech regarding
any activity or product that a state may ban altogether.).
109Rubin, 115 5. Ct. at 1589 n. 2 (reasoning that the greater-lesser power argument was
made only after the Court's held that the regulation survived the Central Hudson four-part
test).
25this justication, a coherent theory and denition of commercial speech will
remain elusive.
At this point we know only that commercial speech constitutes a
limit on the puremarketplace of ideas theory that justied its protection in the
rst place.110 Commercial ideas simply have less value than other kinds of ideas{
government attempts to suppress them warrant only intermediate scrutiny as
a result. Why? The Supreme Court's reasoning amounts to little more than
because we said so, that's why. Prominent commentators have attacked the no-
tion of protecting dierent categories of speech according to their putative value
as fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment.111 For example, Steven
Shirmn writes that the very concept of low-value speech is an embarrassment
to rst amendment orthodoxy. To say that government cannot suppress speech
unless speech is of low-value sounds like a parody of free speech theory. The
censor will always be inclined to say that the speech suppressed is of low-value.
Thus, the low-value exception mocks the rule. It seems almost like saying that
South Africa has a humane racial policy except for its treatment of the blacks.112
Other scholars rail not just against low-value speech theory gener-
ally, but against classifying commercial speech as such. Kozinski and Banner
110Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 763-65.
111See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975); Thomas Emerson, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 326 (1970). Such critics sometimes cite the Supreme Court's words back at it,
for example:
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content... To permit the continued
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulllment for each individual, our
people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.
The essence of the forbidden censorship is content control.
Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1951).
112Steven H. Shirin, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 44
(1990)(footnote omitted).
26argue that in a free market economy, the ability to give and receive information
about commercial matters may be as important, sometimes more important,
than expression of a political, artistic or religious nature. 113 Yet the low-value
commercial speech doctrine remains rmly entrenched in First Amendment ju-
risprudence. The next section demonstrates how the uncertain theoretical basis
of the commercial speech doctrine is reected in the unpredictable doctrinal
framework that has emerged since Virginia Board.
C.Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Inconsistent Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny
1.The Central Hudson Test
The commercial speech cases of the late 1970's reected the Court's
uncertainty as to how to proceed in the wake of Virginia Board. The Court
alternated between balancing the asserted justications for regulating speech
against those for permitting 114 and adhering to a non-balancing approach,
which was described by the Court in Linmark Associates, inc. v. Township of
Willingboro:
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us.115
113Kozinski and Banner, supra note 61, at 652. See also Aaron Director, The Parity of
the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1964)([T]he bulk of mankind will for
the foreseeable future have to devote a considerable fraction of their active lives to economic
activity. For these people freedom of choice as owners of resources in choosing within available
and continually changing opportunities, areas of employment, investment, and consumption
is fully as important as freedom of discussion and participation in government.)
114See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1(1979).
115431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977).
27In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sen'. Comm
116 the Court sought to clarify the test by which government regulations of
commercial speech should be scrutinized. The Court, purporting to reconcile
Virginia Board and its progeny, established what has proved to be an enduring
four-part test.
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has devel-
oped. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. [1] For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we
ask whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.117
While the Court has applied the Central Hudson test in every com-
mercial speech case since 1980, how strictly the Court construes and applies it
in particular cases remains unpredictable.118
2.The Janus Face of Commercial Speech
116447 U.S. 557 (1980).
117ld. at 566. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Court reformulated the Central Hudson
test as a three-pronged inquiry with a threshold requirement that the regulated speech concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. 115 S.Ct. 2371. 2375 (1995). For the purposes of this
paper, I will continue to refer to the four-part Central Hudson test, in keeping with the vast
majority of the cases and law review literature to date.
118See, e.g., Valerie D. Wood, Comment, The Precarious Position of Commercial Speech:
Rubin v. Coors Brewing, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 612-13 (1996)(The Central Hudson
test has proven to be too manipulable to provide any determinate boundaries around when
commercial speech can be regulated. Until the Court sheds more light on the meanings of
the prongs of the test, the protection of commercial speech will be in doubt in each new case.
): P. Cameron DeVore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment,
12-SPG COMM. LAW 1 (1994)(arguing that the 1993 Term once again demonstrated (the
Court's] unpredictable approach to First Amendment protection of commercial speech).
28The FDA's proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising squarely
implicate the unpredictability of the Central Hudson test, particularly its third
and fourth prongs. As to the rst prong, the FDA has not argued to date that
tobacco advertising concerns unlawful activity or is misleading, though others
have made that argument on its behalf.119 Further, the tobacco and advertising
industries concede that the FDA 's interest in protecting the public health120
is suciently substantial121{ they recognize that the Supreme Court has been
unequivocal on this point at least.122 But whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest have proved to be extremely manipulable
standards. Both the FDA and the tobacco lobby can make strong arguments
that recent precedent supports their largely irreconcilable interpretations of the
Central Hudson test. Just last term, in fact, two dierent but overlapping
majorities of justices pronounced two quite dierent standards for evaluating
advertising bans and other commercial speech regulation. 123 A discussion of
these two standards follows. a.Central Hudson Part Three
In one line of post-Central Hudson commercial speech cases, the
119See, e.g., Allison M. Zieve and Alan B. Morrison, Attorneys for Public Citizen, inc.,
Comments of Public Citizen, Inc. Regarding the FDA's Proposal to Regulate the Sale and
Promotion of Tobacco Products to Minors, 102-107 (1996)(hereinafter Public Citizen).
12060 Fed. Reg. at 41,354. Public Citizen argues that such regulations would serve the
additional government interests of avoiding the enormous cost of providing health care to
future generations of smokers and furthering respect for the law. Public Citizen, supra note
118, at 108-109. The FDA would have to make these arguments on its own for a Court to
consider them. See Edeneld v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792. 1798 (1993)(Unlike rational basis
review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put
forward by the State with other suppositions. ).
121See infra part IV.B.2.
122See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 (holding that the legislature's interest in the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest); accord Fox, 492
U.S. at 475; Rubin, 115 S.Ct. at 1591.
123DeVore, supra note 117, at 1.
29Court loosely construes the requirement that the government regulation directly
advance its asserted interest. The cases decided right after Central Hudson ev-
idence considerable deference to legislative judgments that a particular regula-
tion would in fact accomplish its alleged purpose. For example, in Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,124 the Court held that a local ordinance restricting
the erection of billboards directly advanced the government's interest in traf-
c safety. Justice White, writing for a plurality, reasoned that the California
Supreme Court agreed with many other courts that a legislative judgment that
billboards are trac hazards is not manifestly unreasonable and should not be
set aside. We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense
judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards
are real and substantial hazards to trac safety.125
The Court was even more deferential ve years later in Posad as.126
At issue here was a Puerto Rican ban on casino gambling advertising aimed at
the island's residents. The state's asserted interest in the ban was to prevent
increases in crime, prostitution, and maa activity, and to avoid disrupting the
island's residents' moral and cultural patterns.127 The petitioner argued that
the ban failed to advance these interests because advertising of other forms of
gambling, such as horse racing and the lottery, remained lawful.128 In rejecting
this argument, the Court appeared to hold the legislature to little more than a
good faith standard.
124453 U.S. 490 (1981).
125ld. at 508.
126478 U.S. 328 (1986).
127Id. at 341.
128Id. at 342.
30The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted
the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling
aimed at residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the
product advertised. We think that the legislature's belief is a reasonable one....
[Further,] the legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans the risks associated with
casino gambling were signicantly greater than those associated with the more
traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico. In our view, the legislature's
[determination].., satises the third step of the Central Hudson analysis.129
As discussed supra part III, Posadas has been severely criticized
and subsequently limited, though this aspect of its holding remains nominally
good law.
A recent case indicates the Court's continued, if occasional, willing-
ness to defer to a legislative judgment that a challenged regulation will directly
advance the government s asserted interests. In United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co. ,130 the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting radio broadcast
of lottery advertising by licensees located in nonlottery states{ a ban enacted to
prevent lottery states from interfering with the policy of neighboring nonlottery
states. The statute prohibited the respondent{ a North Carolina licensee whose
listeners were 90 percent Virginians{ from broadcasting advertisements for the
Virginia lottery.131 Respondents argued that the regulation, as applied, failed
to satisfy Central Hudson's third prong because so few of its listeners lived in a
nonlottery state. Yet the Court, again per Justice White, rejected the argument
129Id. at 341-43.
130113 S.Ct. 2696 (1993).
131Id. at 2699.
31without any empirical or statistical analysis, and agreed with Congress's com-
monsense judgment that each North Carolina station would have an audience in
that state, even if its signal reached elsewhere and that enforcing the statutory
restriction would insulate each station's listeners from lottery ads and hence
advance the governmental purpose of supporting North Carolina's laws against
gambling.132
The Court did not specify by what standard advancement of the
government's ostensible purpose is to be measured. 133
Edge Broadcasting notwithstanding, the clear trend of recent cases
has been to hold the government to a high burden of proof under Central Hud-
son's third prong.134 In Edeneld v. Fane{ decided two months before Edge
Broadcasting!{ the Court described the test in newly stringent terms, framing
the issue as whether the challenged regulation advances these interests in a di-
rect and material way. 135 The Court explained that: the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineective or remote support for the government's
purpose.... This burden is not satised by mere speculation or conjecture; rather,
a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree... Without this requirement, a State could
with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of other objectives that could
132Id. at 2704.
133DeVore, supra note 117, at 26.
134It is well-settled that Itihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of justifying it. Edeneld v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993)(quoting
Bolger v. Yonngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n. 20 (1983)).
135113 S.Ct. at 1798. Edge Broadcasting did not cite the Edeneld renement of the test.
32not by themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.136
Applying this language, the Court struck down a Florida ban on
in-person solicitation by CPA's. Florida justied the regulation on the grounds
that it would advance the state's interests (which the Court held substantial)
in preventing fraud and deception, protecting privacy, and maintaining the fact
and appearance of independence among CPA's.137 The
Court held, however, that the ban failed the third prong of the
Central Hudson test, based on (1) the state's failure to present any studies or
anecdotal evidence, either from Florida or another State that suggest that a
ban would prevent these harms; (2) the state's submission of a single adavit
that contained nothing more than a series of conclusory statements: and (3) the
existence of contradictory evidence.138
Last term, the Edeneld renement of Central Hudson's third prong
proved the decisive basis on which the Court struck down a longstanding federal
law prohibiting beer labels from containing alcohol content information.139 In
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company,140 the Court held that this law failed to
advance in a direct and material way the government's admittedly substantial
interest in curbing strength wars among beer brewers.141 Characterizing the
136ld. at 1800 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).
137Id. at 1799.
138Id. at 1800-1801. In striking down the Florida statute, the Court distinguished Obralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), in which the Court upheld Ohio's ban on in-person
solicitation by lawyers. 113 5. Ct. at 1802-1804. The Court based the distinction on alleged
dierences between the professions. Id.
139The Court's decision in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Reg-
ulation, Board of Accountancy, 114 5. Ct. 2084 (1994)(holding that Florida Board of Ac-
countancy's reprimand of petitioner violated her First Amendment rights), cited the Edeneld
formulation but rested primarily on the determination that the interests asserted by the state
were not substantial.
140115 5. Ct. 1585 (1995).
141115 S.Ct. at 1589-93.
33third prong as critical,142 the Court rejected the government's argument that
preventing beer brewers from displaying alcohol strength on beer labels would
prevent consumers from choosing beers solely for their alcohol content. 143 The
Court agreed with the District and Appellate Courts' conclusion that the Gov-
ernment had failed to present any credible evidence showing that the disclosure
of alcohol content would promote strength wars. 144 The Court also cited the
overall irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme{ which permitted
beer brewers to continue to advertise alcohol content in the 32 states that do not
themselves prohibit such advertising{ and dismissed the government's common
sense and historical arguments.145 The Court concluded that
[t]he Government's brief submits anecdotal evidence and educated
guesses to suggest that competition on the basis of alcohol content is occurring
today and that [the challenged regulation's ban] has constrained strength wars
that otherwise would burst out of control. These various tidbits, however, can-
not overcome the irrationality of the regulatory scheme and the weight of the
record. The Government did not oer any convincing evidence that the labeling
ban has inhibited strength wars.146
Later in the term, the Court held the Edeneld formulation of
Central Hudson's third prong satised in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,147
but the decision reected no deference whatsoever to the legislative judgment
142Id. at 1592-93.
143Id. at 1590.
144Id. at 1592.
145The government argued that lilt is assuredly a matter of 'common sense'...that a restriction
on the advertising of a product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers select
a product on the basis of that trait. ld. at 1592 (cite to Brief for Petitioner omitted).
146Id. at 1593.
147115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
34in question. Rather, after scouring the record, the Court held that a 106 page
summary of a 2 year study, containing statistical data and an anecdotal record
noteworthy for its breadth and detail, adequately supports the conclusion that
the government regulation would advance its asserted justication in a direct
and material way.148
The more recent case law indicates, then, that the FDA will be
required to satisfy a high burden of proof in demonstrating that the proposed
restrictions would advance its interest in public health in a direct and material
way. While the Court might at any time revert to the more deferential ap-
proach exemplied by Metromedia and Posadas, as it did in Edge Broadcasting,
the FDA must be prepared to meet the standard established inEdeneld, Rubin,
and Florida Bar.149 Under the test as applied in these three cases, the consti-
tutionality of the advertising restrictions and public education campaign will
hinge on the FDA's ability to provide ample scientic, statistical, and anecdo-
tal evidence that these measures will reduce youth and adolescent tobacco use{
or on the tobacco lobby's ability to provide sucient evidence to the contrary.
These arguments are explored in detail infra part IV.B.3.b. b Central Hudson
Part Four
On its face, the language of the fourth prong{ which asks whether
148Id. at 2377-78.
149Until last term, the FDA could have argued that regulations of commercial speech con-
cerning socially harmful activities are entitled to even more deference than commercial speech
restrictions generally. The argument rested on the Court's considerable deference to the leg-
islative judgments at issue in Edge Broadcasting (lottery advertising) and Posadas (casino
gambling advertising). In Rubin, however, the Court explicitly laid to rest the notion of
a Central Hudson exception for speech concerning such activities. 115 S.Ct. at 1589 n. 2.
Clearly a socially harmful activities exception would have proved extremely useful to the FDA
in arguing for the constitutionality of the proposed restrictions at issue here.
35the challenged regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve the
government's asserted itere5t150{ suggests a least restrictive means test.151
Indeed, in Central Hudson itself, the Court explained that if a government
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive. 152 The Court proceeded to
strike down a New York law that ordered electric utilities to cease advertising
that promotes the use of electricity as more extensive than necessary to advance
the state's interest in energy conservation.153 Five years later, in Zauderer v.
Oce of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,154 the Court assumed
in dicta the validity of the least restrictive means approach.155
Despite the Court's nominal adherence to the protective Central
Hudson standard, the cases made clear that the Court favored a more exible
approach.156 Finally, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox,157 the Court explicitly retreated from the least restrictive means standard
and adopted a more lenient test. After summarizing the conicting tenor of
[its] prior dicta, the Court focus[ed] on this specic issue for the rst time, and
concluded that the subordinate position [of commercial speech] in the scale of
150See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-508; Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass1n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
151As a doctrinal sidenote, the overbreadth doctrine has no application in the context of
commercial speech. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In other words,
unprotected (i.e. false or misleading) commercial speech does not receive constitutional pro-
tection even if eorts to regulate it are overbroad.
152447 U.S. at 564.
153Id. at 569-71.
154471 U.S. 626 (1985).
155Id at 651 n.14.
156See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)(upholding state rules restricting lawyer ad-
vertising); San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522 (1987)(upholding injunction enjoining use of word Olympic to promote Gay Olympic
Games).
157492 U.S. 469 (1989).
36First Amendment values required something short of a least-restrictive means
standard.158 The Court described the appropriate standard as follows:
What our decisions require is a 't between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,'...- a t that is not neces-
sarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,'.., that
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but... a means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to the
governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed.159
The Court did not apply the standard as the case was remanded
for further proceedings. The Court did apply the Fox renement of Central
Hudson's fourth prong in upholding the state regulations challenged last term
in Florida Bar.160 At issue in this case were bar rules prohibiting lawyers from
using direct mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within 30
days of accidents.161 The asserted government interest was protecting the pri-
vacy and tranquillity of personal injury victims and their loved ones against
intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers. 162 The Court rejected petitioners'
argument that the ban's failure to distinguish between victims in terms of sever-
ity of injury or state of mind rendered it insuciently tailored to the asserted
interest, and held the rule reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of
158Id. at 477-78.
159Id. at 480 (footnotes omitted).
160115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
161Id. at 2374.
162Id. at 2376.
37eliminating targeted mailings whose type and timing are a source of distress to
Floridians, distress that has caused many of them to lose respect for the legal
profession. 163
Florida Bar revives the deferential Fox renement, which appeared
to have been limited by the Court's decisions in City of Cincinnati v. Discov-
ery Network, 164and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.165 In Discovery Network,
the challenged ordinance prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills on
public property, a ban motivated by [the city's] interest in the safety and attrac-
tive appearance of its streets and sidewalks. 166 Because the eect of the law
was to require the removal of 62 commercial news racks from public locations,
while 1500-2000 noncommercial news racks were permitted to stay, commercial
publishers argued that the regulation did not have the requisite t with the
city's interest in reducing visual blight.167 The Court agreed, holding that the
fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern about news
racks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it
has not carefully calculated' the costs and benets associated with the burden
on speech.168
The Court carefully explained in a footnote that its decision did not
mark a return to the least restrictive means test, but if there are numerous and
obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech,
163Id.at 2380.
164113 S.Ct. 1505 (1993).
165115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
166Id. at 1510.
167id.
168Id.
38that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 't' between
ends and means is reasonable. 169
In Rubin, the Court appeared to reinforce Central Hudson's fourth
prong even further. Having already held that the federal prohibition of alcohol
content on beer labeling failed Central Hudson's third prong, the Court noted
in dicta that the regulation was also insuciently tailored to its goal. The avail-
ability of several alternatives to the prohibition170{ not numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives{ indicates that [the challenged regulation] is more
extensive than necessary. 171
Thus, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test is even more
unpredictable than the third, with no clear trend emerging from even the most
recent cases. The Court purports not to adhere to a least restrictive means test,
but Rubin suggests that the existence of any alternative less burdensome of com-
mercial speech may jeopardize the constitutionality of the challenged regulation.
As discussed infra part IV.B.4, the tobacco lobby's ability to demonstrate the
existence of less burdensome alternatives will determine the fate of the proposed
rules under the fourth prong.
IV.THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FDA'S PROPOSAL
As the foregoing analysis makes clear, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration proposes its regulations of tobacco advertising aimed at young people
amidst considerable doctrinal inconsistency and theoretical uncertainty in the
169Id. at 1510 n. 13.
170115 S.Ct. 1585, 1593 (listing available alternatives as directly limiting the alcohol content
of beers, prohibiting marketing eorts emphasizing high alcohol strength, or limiting the
labeling ban only to malt liquors).
171Id. at 1593-94 (emphasis added).
39law. Yet the FDA, after taking just three pages of the Federal Register to spell
out its legal analysis,172 concludes with apparent ease that both the advertising
restrictions and the education campaign would withstand any First Amendment
challenge. 173 As this part makes clear, the FDA's analysis of the constitutional
issues raised by its proposal is far too simplistic. The tobacco lobby can mount
an extremely persuasive argument that (1) the public education campaign co-
erces fully protected speech, and should be struck down under strict scrutiny;
(2) the rules that concern only commercial speech nonetheless fail the Cen-
tral Hudson test as it has been dened in recent cases; and (3) irrespective of
any doctrine, a coherent theory of the First Amendment holds the regulations
unconstitutional. This part addresses these arguments in turn.
A. Does the FDA propose to regulate more than just commercial
speech?
The FDA assumes without a word of analysis that the speech it
proposes both to restrict and compel is entirely commercial. This assumption
is only partly well-founded. The Supreme Court's clear holding that adver-
tising pure and simple is commercial speech174 forecloses an argument that
the proposed restrictions of outdoor advertising and advertising in publications
without a primarily adult readership should not be subjected to intermediate
scrutiny.175 Indeed, such advertising is at the core of commercial speech as
172FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,353-355.
173Id at 41,354
174Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636.
175See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1980)(subjecting restric-
tions of billboard advertising to Central Hudson test); Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc.
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. led. 64 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1995)(No. 95-806)(applying Central Hudson test
40identied in Discovery Network.176
A slightly closer question might be presented by the proposed pro-
hibitions of (1) selling or otherwise distributing promotional items bearing the
name, selling message, or logo of a tobacco product, and (2) sponsoring any ath-
letic, musical, artistic, or other event that involves the use of the corporation, or
a brand name, selling message, logo, or other indicia of product identication.
These forms of commercial expression are designed to promote what advertising
mogul Leo Burnett once described as friendly familiarity,177 or brand awareness.
While they do not propose a specic transaction, as does most core commercial
speech, such promotional activities build a growing familiarity with a product
name and trademark and condence in it. 178 Increased familiarity results in
increased market share, and thus an increased number of commercial transac-
tions.
There is little constitutionally signicant distinction between adver-
tising and these forms of promotional expression. Indeed, the reason for putting
a brand logo on a hat or a car or a concert t-shirt is to create moving (and of-
ten human) billboards for particular products.179 As Public Citizen argues,
the FDA took pains to limit the reach of its proposed rules to those activities
to local ordinance restricting outdoor advertising of cigarettes).
176113 S.Ct. 1505, 1513 (1993).
177j~ Burnett, supra note 33, at 5.
178Id.
179See Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 92 (The courts have made clear that the 'commercial
speech' doctrine applies to speech well beyond that which merely proposes a sale. Rather,
as the Court emphasized in Bolger, any speech that links a product with a selling message
constitutes commercial speech... Thus, for instance, placing a Marlboro logo on a T-shirt is
an expressive act within commercial speech doctrine, since the point of doing so is to convert
the T-shirt into a walking billboard that conveys a selling message specic to an individual
product{ i.e., buy and smoke Marlboro cigarettes.).
41undertaken by tobacco companies and their advertisers to promote the sale of
tobacco products.180 Under Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, Inc.{ where the
expression's reference to a specic product name and economic motivation were
two factors that supported the Court's conclusion that the suppressed speech
was commercial{ these forms of expression are clearly commercial.181 The ex-
pansive denition of commercial speech oered in Central Hudson ,182 and the
Court's decision in Discovery Network to subject a regulation of non-core com-
mercial speech to the Central Hudson test,183 clearly suggest that the denition
of commercial speech is not narrow and formalistic.
The tobacco lobby might respond that, because categorizing ex-
pression as lowvalue speech renders it more easily suppressed, the dangers of
censorship mandate that a court act cautiously at the margins of the category.
This caution requires a court to note that a third factor was at work in Bolger,
the Central Hudson denition has never been followed, and the speech at is-
sue in Discovery Network bears no resemblance to these expressive promotional
activities. The argument that such promotional expression is not commercial
speech breaks down, however, upon trying to explain what else it is. Attempts
to paint such expression as examples of self-realization or political speech would
be unconvincing for obvious reasons.184 In addition, no Supreme Court case
180Id.
181463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
182447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)(dening commercial speech as expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience).
183Discovery Network, 113 5. Ct. at 1514.
184As discussed supra part III.B., corporate speech is inconsistent with the notions of indi-
vidual liberty and self-fulllment that are the basis of the self-realization theory of the First
Amendment. Thus, the argument that such speech is expressive is runs into trouble upon
trying to discern who doing the expressing. Leo Burnett, supra note 33, at 42-44 argues that
the restrictions impermissibly limilt] the creative range of individual expression by preventing
42supports the literalist notion that only speech that does no more than propose
a commercial transaction counts as commercial speech for the purposes of the
First Amendment. In the nal analysis, no basis exists for treating these forms
of promotional expression as anything but commercial speech. 185
The same may not be said, however, of the FDA's proposed public
education campaign. As noted supra part II.B., proposed section 897.29 would
require each manufacturer to establish and maintain [at a cost of $150 million
per year] a national public educational program, including major reliance on
television messages, to combat the eects of pervasive and positive imagery
that has for decades helped to foster a youth market for tobacco products. 186
It is well-settled, of course, that rules that coerce speech may violate the First
Amendment just as easily as laws that suppress it. 187Unless the expression
compelled is deemed commercial, such a regulation is unconstitutional unless it
is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.188
Much rides, then, on the FDA's ability to characterize the speech as commercial.
The proposed public education campaign appears to coerce fully
people from wearing hats or shirts with the logo of their choice. Though creative, the argu-
ment is not on point{ the case would be a dierent one if the expression at issue were that of
private citizens and not intended to propose commercial transactions.
185See also David A. Locke, Note, Counterspeech As An Alternative to Prohibition: Pro-
posed Federal Regulation of Tobacco Promotion in American Motorsport, 70 ND. L. J. 217,
239 (1 994)(arguing that a challenge to proposal would implicate the commercial speech doc-
trine).
186FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326.
187See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)([T]he right to freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all). This right extends to corporations. See Turner
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994); Pacic Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)(For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak
includes within it the choice of what not to say.).
188Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800(1988).
43protected{ not commercial'{ speech. 189 P. Cameron DeVore and Burt Neuborne,
two of the nation's foremost authorities on commercial speech jurisprudence,
vigorously argue this point on behalf of the Association of National Advertisers.
This education program... compels manufacturers to engage in fully
protected{not commercial{ speech by nancing and disseminating the govern-
ment's viewpoint on issues of public importance.... The messages the FDA
proposes to require manufacturers to disseminate do not contain commercial
speech. Although the manufacturers would be required to pay to produce and
broadcast these messages, none of the messages proposes a commercial trans-
action or claries the terms or conditions of a commercial transaction. Rather,
these messages would contain speech on addiction, the health risks associated
with beginning to smoke at a young age, and dealing with social inuences
experienced by young people.190
In a similar vein, former Judge Robert Bork, writing for the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation and an informal coalition of race car drivers, argues
that [t]his speech... would not be 'commercial' under any accepted denition of
the term. Rather, the content of these messages are to be educational in nature.
191
While the outer margins of the commercial speech category are
uncertain, the FDA1s proposal contradicts even the vague contours that emerge
189Association of National Advertisers, Inc., Submission of the Association of National Ad-
vertisers, Inc. in Connection with Proposed Regulations Restricting Advertising of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco Products, Docket No. 95N-0253, 51(1995) (hereinafter ANA).
190Id. at 52-53.
191Robert H. Bork and Daniel J. Popeo, Comments of the Washington Legal Foundation,
Mario Andretti, Tony Bettenhausen, Don Garlits, Al Unser, Rusty Wallace, and Cale Yarbor-
ough, Docket No. 95N-0253, p. 36 (December 28, 1995)(hereinafter Bork).
44from dicta. In Virginia Board, for example, the Court noted that the speech
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial
subject. No one would contend that [a] pharmacist may be prevented from being
heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be
regulated, or their advertisement forbidden. 192 Likewise here, the FDA would
coerce the tobacco industry into speaking about whether, in general, kids should
smoke. That money is spent to project the expression does not cause it to lose
First Amendment protection.193
While the FDA asserts that the education campaign would be con-
sistent with disclosure and corrective advertising requirements upheld in com-
mercial contexts, even Public Citizen{ which defends the constitutionality of
every other aspect of the proposed rule and applauds the FDA's goal of es-
tablishing a comprehensive public education campaign{ concedes that existing
case law does not support such an ambitious program.194 First, the FDA begs
the denitional question by citing cases where the compelled speech was clearly
commercial. 195Second, a crucial distinction between the FDA's proposal and
other constitutionally permissible rules compelling speech is that the FDA pro-
poses to require speech entirely distinct from any speech initiated by product
manufacturers concerning the sale of tobacco products.196 For example, in Za-
192452 U.S. at 761-62 (emphasis added).
193Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976).
194Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 141-46.
195The FDA cites Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771 n. 24 (They may also make it appropriate
to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.) and
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)(warning or disclaimer might be appropriately required...
in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception). FDA Proposal, 60
Fed. Reg. at 41,355.
196ANA, supra note 188, at 53.
45uderer v. Oce of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,197 the Court
upheld a state bar rule requiring attorneys who advertise their willingness to
work on a contingent fee basis to disclose that clients may have to bear litigation
expenses even if they lose. The Court reasoned that the state had attempted
merely to require that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be
available. 198 Compare the messages compelled by the FDA's educational cam-
paign, which would not be uncontroversial, would have no direct bearing on the
terms of a particular transaction, and would appear entirely separate from to-
bacco advertising{ indeed, the program would be partly on television and radio,
where tobacco advertising is prohibited!199
Once it becomes apparent that the FDA's proposed education cam-
paign would compel fully protected speech, its unconstitutionality is clear in
light of Pacjc Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Cali-
fornia,200 where the Court struck down a far less drastic attempt to compel
non-commercial speech about a commercial subject. At issue in this case was
a state requirement that public utilities provide ratepayer advocacy groups ac-
cess to utility newsletters included with customer bills.201 The Court reasoned
that, because the newsletter and the envelope itself belonged to the utility, the
agency impermissibly compelled the utility to engage in fully protected speech
by requiring it to use its property as a vehicle for spreading a message with
197471 U.S. 626 (1985).
198Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
199ANA, supra note 188, at 53.
200475 U.S. 1(1986).
201Id.
46which it disagrees. 202 In the present case, not only would the tobacco industry
disagree with much of what the FDA would compel it to say, but the FDA would
choose the messages that would run directly counter to the industry's nancial
interests.203 That the messages may contain statements of fact does not render
the proposal any more constitutional, as the Court has clearly held.204 Once
again, even Public Citizen concedes that the theory that it is constitutionally
permissible to compel a company to fund a message that it nds abhorrent as
a condition of allowing the company to engage in other commercial, expressive
activities is unlikely to prevail.205
Thus, the public education campaign fails even to get to rst base,
and only the FDA's proposed restrictions of advertising and promotional activ-
ities move on to be subjected to the Central Hudson test.
B.The FDA Proposal and the Two Faces of Central Hudson
The FDA argues that its proposed restrictions of tobacco advertis-
ing are designed to reduce the appeal of tobacco products to young people.206
Because advertising and promotional activities can inuence a young person's
decision to smoke or use smokeless tobacco products, the FDA contends that
reducing their appeal will reduce the number of young people inuenced by
202Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
203See also Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)(holding uncon-
stitutional a Florida law requiring newspapers who criticize a political candidate's character
or record to print a reply of equal prominence and space).
204See, e.g., Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 114
S.Ct. 2084 (1994)(striking down state law requiring a Certied Financial Planner to include in
advertisements the truthful statement that CFP designation was granted by organization not
aliated with the government); Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)(striking down state requirement that professional fundraisers disclose
the percentage of funds they paid to charities).
205Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 143.
206FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,354.
47them.207 As this section demonstrates, whether these conclusions are true as
empirical or scientic matters is uncertain. The critical legal question is whether
the proposed restrictions are nonetheless constitutional in spite of this uncer-
tainty. In its legal analysis, the FDA relies exclusively on the line of cases most
deferential to legislative judgments and, therefore, most permissive of govern-
ment regulations of commercial speech. Not surprisingly, the FDA concludes
the Central Hudson test easily satised. This section attempts a more com-
plete analysis, taking account of the competing strain of the case law, drawing
conclusions far more hesitantly as to the constitutionality of the scheme.
1.Is tobacco advertising misleading' or does it concern unlawful
activity?
As noted supra part III.C.2., the FDA does not argue that to-
bacco advertising falls outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection
altogether on the grounds that it concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.
One might have expected the FDA to make either argument, or both, as Pub-
lic Citizen urges in its comment.208 The FDA presents evidence elsewhere in
its proposal that much of the promotional eorts of the tobacco industry are
geared toward an illegal end{ inducing minors to try and break the law by ob-
taining cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products that may not legally be sold
or otherwise provided to them. 209 For example, the FDA describes industry
207Id. at 41,315.
208Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 96-107.
209Id.at 98. Indeed, when President Clinton was asked at the news conference announcing
the rules if they violated the First Amendment, it was on this basis that he defended them.
It is illegal for children to smoke cigarettes. How then can it be legal for people to advertise
to children to get them to smoke cigarettes? MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, August 10, 1995.
48documents that it claims suggest not only that tobacco manufacturers know
that their advertising campaigns induce minors to smoke, but that certain cam-
paigns (like the one featuring the notorious Joe Camel) were initiated precisely
for this purpose.210 Further, the FDA's intent generally is to restrict the ubiq-
uitous images and messages [that] convey to young people that tobacco use is
desirable, socially acceptable, safe, healthy, and prevalent in society211{ images
and messages that the FDA believes to be deceptive.
The FDA's decision not to adopt this line of argument may be
represent a strategic decision to stake out a moderate position in the hopes that
the industry would more readily accept it.212 If so, the Liggett Group's recent
settlement suggests that the strategy may be paying o. The decision might
rest on other considerations, however, such as the substantial diculty and
cost involved in attempting to prove such claims; the body of lower court case
law treating similar types of advertising as concerning lawful activity and not
deceptive213; avoiding jurisdictional overlap with and intrusion on the Federal
Trade Commission. Whatever its reasons, because the FDA has not drafted
its proposal (nor has the lobby drafted its comments) with these arguments in
mind, a full analysis of these issues at this point is premature and thus beyond
the scope of this paper.
2, Is the FDA's asserted interest substantial?
210FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,330-331
2111d at 41,314.
212The decision may be an example of the real administrative law that we discussed so often
in class.
213See, e.g., Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d 1318: Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d 1305; Dunagin
v. City of Oxford Mississippi, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984)(upholding state law prohibiting liquor advertising).
49The FDA asserts that its interest in proposing these restrictions is
to promote public health by reducing the death and disease caused by tobacco
products.214 As noted supra part III.C.2., the Supreme Court has held an as-
serted interest in the public health suciently substantial in several cases,215
and would surely do so here. While conceding that the FDA's articulated inter-
est in protecting minors from physical harm clearly is substantial, the tobacco
lobby argues that this is hardly an interest directly served by the regulations.
216 Instead, the industry argues that the only aim these regulations can be
said to serve in any direct way is that of helping to delegitimize smoking... to
acculturate citizens to abandon the notion that smoking is socially acceptable
and to embrace the ideals of a smoke-free society. 217 The goal of this pater-
nalistic campaign, the industry concludes, cannot even be deemed a legitimate,
let alone substantial interest.218
This argument misunderstands the second prong of the Central
Hudson test. The argument that the restrictions do not directly advance the
asserted interest bears on the third element of the test. Further, the Central
Hudson test does not appear to contemplate an inquiry into the government's
214Id.
215See supra note 121. See also Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. led, 64 U.S.L.W.
3399 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1995)(No. 95-806)(there can be little opposition to the assertion that the
City's objective in reducing cigarette consumption by minors constitutes a substantial public
interest).
216Comments of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Liggett Group Inc., Lorillard To-
bacco Company, Phillip Morris Incorporated, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Tobacco
Institute Inc. Before the United States Food and Drug, Volume IX, Docket Nos. 95N-0253
and -02531, 23-24(1995)(hereinafter Tobacco Industry).
217Id.at 24 (emphasis in original).
218Id. See also, ANA, supra note 188, at 16 (much could be said about whether the Executive
branch's and the FDA's interest is, in fact, the concededly substantial one of protecting the
health of minors now and in the future).
50real motive for enacting a rule. The second prong asks merely whether the
asserted government interest is substantial. 219 The tobacco lobby cites, and
further research reveals, no commercial speech cases invalidating state action on
the grounds that the government's asserted interest was not, in fact, the actual
motivation behind the law.
3.Do the FDA restrictions directly advance its asserted interest?
a.Conicting Standards
The FDA's ability to satisfy Central Hudson's critical third prong
hinges rst on how its burden of proof is dened. Predictably, the FDA argues
that it should be held to the extremely deferential Central Hudson third prong
standard articulated in Edge Broadcasting, Posadas, and Metromedia.220 The
FDA denes for itself the lowest possible burden:
The Supreme Court has stated that, when determining whether an
action advances the governmental interest, it is willing to defer to the 'common-
sense judgments' of the regulatory agency as long as they are not unreasonable.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509 (We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accu-
mulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers... ).221
At rst glance, making this claim without so much as a cf of the
competing standard dened in Edeneld and Rubin smacks of wishful think-
ing.222 Yet a pair of recent Fourth Circuit decisions bolsters the agency's con-
219Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added).
220See supra part III.C.2.a.
221FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,354.
222Indeed, some aspects of its reasoning are clearly so. For example, the FDA wholly disre-
gards the footnote in Rubin that expressly disavows both (1) a lower level of protection for
speech that advertises socially harmful activities and (2) the greater-lesser power reasoning
of Posadas. See Rubin, 115 S.Ct. at 1589 n.2. Undaunted, the FDA makes these arguments
51tention that this, indeed, is the applicable rule.
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, the court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a Baltimore ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising
of alcoholic beverages in publicly visible locations, including outdoor billboards,
sides of buildings, and free standing signboards. 223 Citing the same trilogy of
cases{ Metromedia, Posadas, and Edge Broadcasting{ the court dened the test
as follows:
There is a logical nexus between the City's objective and it means it
selected for achieving that objective, and it is not necessary, in satisfying Central
Hudson's third prong, to prove conclusively that the correlation in fact exists,
or that the steps undertaken will solve the problem.... The proper standard for
approval must involve an assessment of the reasonableness of the legislature's
belief that the means it selected will advance its ends.224
The legislative nding that the majority of research studies show a
denite correlation between alcoholic beverage advertising and underage drink-
ing, while recognizing that not all studies reached the same conclusion satised
the City's burden under this test. Like the FDA's proposal, the court made no
attempt to reconcile these cases with Edeneld and Rubin. The Fourth Circuit
reached the identical conclusion, applying the exact same test, to the companion
case involving cigarette advertising. In Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ,225 the Court held that a similar prohibi-
anyway at 60 Fed. Reg. 41,355.
22363 F.3d 1305, 1308 (4th Cir. 1995), pen non for cert. led, 64 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Oct.
27, 1995)(No. 95-685).
224Id. at 13 14-15 (emphasis added).
22563 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. led, 64 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov. 22,
52tion of outdoor cigarette advertising in publicly visible locations did not violate
the First Amendment. Reasoning that the City could satisfy its burden by
pointing to legislative facts, studies, history, or common sense, the court merely
quoted the Anheuser-Busch passage excerpted above, and held the test satised
based on evidence gathered during public hearings of the city council.226
The FDA's apparent assurance that its restrictions will pass con-
stitutional muster is well-placed if the Fourth Circuit cases indicate the scrutiny
to which they will be subjected. Surely the evidence the FDA presents in sup-
port of its restrictions{ which is discussed more fully infra { satises the meager
standard of review dened in Metromedia and applied by the Fourth Circuit. If
the tobacco lobby is to prevail, it must change the terms of the debate.
The tobacco lobby responds that the First Amendment protection
of commercial speech is far more substantial than FDA has recognized and
accuses the FDA of fall[ing] far short of acknowledging the Supreme Court's
most recent description of the commercial speech doctrine in Rubin.227 The
review actually applied, it argues, though somewhat less exacting than strict
scrutiny..., is nonetheless demanding... [and] the government's power to suppress
commercial speech is severely circumscribed.228 As to the third prong, the
tobacco interests argue that the FDA's burden armatively to demonstrate the
1995)(No. 95-806).
226id. at 1323, 1325. Cf. Sterling Doubleday Enterprises, L.P. v. City of New York, No.
6855/94 , slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Queens Cty. Dec. 8, 1994)(denying a preliminary injunction
that would have directed the removal a Marlboro billboard facing the center eld playing area
in New York's Shea Stadium). Noting that concern for children may not be permitted to
cloud the dispositive factual and constitutional issues, the Court held that the city failed to
establish that the particular sign in issue is 'aimed' at children, or has in the past, or will in
the future, induce children to smoke cigarettes. Slip op. at 2.
227Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 19.
228ld. at 21.
53direct advancement of its goals has repeatedly and ever more forcefully been
emphasized by the Supreme Court in recent years. 229 Thus, the ANA cites as
the applicable test the Edeneld formulation of the standard as it was described
in Rubin:
[T]he Government carries the burden of showing that the challenged
regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a direct and material way.'
That burden is not satised by mere conjecture; rather, a governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree.230
Such an unequivocal statement in a 1995 Supreme Court decision
would foreclose this dispute in most contexts, but the Fourth Circuit cases
illustrate the continuing unpredictability of the commercial speech doctrine.
While the FDA's restrictions satisfy the low burden of proof it has selectively
dened for itself, the Rubin reformulation poses a much stier test. A court
adhering to Rubin would look much more critically at the evidence that is
summarized in the next section. b.Conicting Evidence
A comprehensive review of the extensive literature concerning the
strength of the connection between advertising and tobacco use by minors is
beyond the scope of this paper. Even a brief summary, however, suces to
illustrate that the jury is still out on this question.
The FDA argues that tobacco advertising plays an important role
229Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
230ANA, supra note 188, at 17 (citations omitted).
54in a youth's decision to use tobacco. 231 Tobacco companies use images that
appeal specically to young people, such as the rugged and masculine Marl-
boro Man and the cool Joe Camel, thereby linking smoking to success, social
acceptance, sophistication and a desirable lifestyle. 232 In short, tobacco adver-
tising capitalizes on typical teen notions of insecurity and invulnerability and
convinces them that smoking will create for them the desired self-image and
the ability to communicate that image to others, all without the risk of any
harm.233
In support of its theory, the FDA oers evidence{ gathered primar-
ily from 1994 reports of the Surgeon General234 and Institute of Medicine235{
sucient to conclude that advertising and labeling play a signicant and impor-
tant contributory role in a young person's decision to use cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco products. 236 The FDA claims that the rst and most compelling piece
of evidence supporting restrictions on cigarette and smokeless tobacco product...
advertising and promotion is that these products are among the most heavily
advertised products in America. 237 The FDA then describes three categories of
231FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,329.
232President Clinton himself claimed that Joe Camel tells young children that smoking is
cool. TeenAgers and Tobacco, NEW YoRK TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A18. The FDA
argues that tobacco industry documents reveal that cigarette manufacturers have conducted
extensive research on smoking behavior and attitudes in young people and how advertisements
should be made to appeal to young people. FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,329. Indeed,
such a strategy is necessary, according to the FDA, to the economic health of the industry as
a whole and individual rms in particular. For example, the FDA proposal cites a document
acquired from the Canadian sister company of Brown & Williamson that reads:
If the last ten years has taught us anything, it is that the industry is dominated by the
companies who respond most eectively to the needs of younger smokers. Id. at 41,331.
233FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,329. Moreover, even campaigns not so blatantly
directed at juveniles,.., using more universal themes can be as eective with young people. Id.
at 41,330.
2341994 SGR, supra note 10.
235IOM, supra note 10.
236FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,332 (emphasis added).
237Id.at 41,329. The FDA claims that the tobacco industry spent $6.2 billion in 1993 on the
55additional evidence: (1) studies demonstrating that young people are aware of,
respond favorably to, and are inuenced by cigarette advertising,238; (2) stud-
ies of selective advertising campaigns that were eective with children, 239; (3)
direct quantitative studies showing the relationship between advertising and to-
bacco use and of the eects of advertising restrictions and bans on consumption.
240
The FDA concludes on the basis of this evidence that the prepon-
derance of quantitative and qualitative studies of cigarette advertising suggests:
(1) A causal relationship between advertising and youth smoking behavior, and
(2) a positive eect of stringent advertising measures on smoking rates and on
youth smoking... Finally, examples of specic campaigns directed at young peo-
ple support the hypothesis that cigarette advertising and promotion play an
important role in encouraging young people to start smoking, to sustain their
smoking habit, and to increase consumption.241
advertising, promotion, and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. Id. at 41,315.
238Id. at 41,332-333. For example, the FDA cites a recent Gallup survey Ithati found that
87 percent of adolescents surveyed could recall seeing one or more tobacco advertisements
and that half could identify the brand name associated with one of four popular cigarette
slogans, Id. at 41,332; a survey that found a positive relationship between smoking level and
cigarette advertisement recognition, Id.; a study of 640 Glasgow children that concludes that
cigarette advertising has predisposing, as well as reinforcing, eects on children's attitudes
towards smoking and their smoking intentions. Id.
239Id. at 41,333. The FDA cites numerous studies of the notorious Joe Camel ad campaign,
including a report that found that teenagers were twice as likely as adults to identify Camel
cigarettes as one of the two most advertised brands. id. A study funded by R.J. Reynolds
that found that 72 percent of 6 year olds and 52 percent of children between the ages of 3 and
6 could identify Joe Camel. These rates exceeded recognition rates for Ronald McDonald,
a remarkable statistic given that Ronald McDonald appears on television during children's
viewing hours and cigarette advertising may not appear on T.V. Id. The FDA also cites data
collected in 1990 by California researchers nding a that Camel experienced a 230 percent
increase in its under 18 market share from (pre-Joe Camel) 1986 to 1990. Id.
240id. at 41,333-334. The FDA cites studies of the experience of other nations showing a
positive relationship between advertising restrictions or bans and reductions in smoking rates
among young people.
241Id. at 41,334.
56The tobacco lobby has a three-fold response to the FDA's evidence.
First, it alleges that the FDA misunderstands the purpose and eect of its
advertising. Leo Burnett maintains that the purpose of tobacco advertising is to
maintain brand loyalty and encourage brand switching among adults who choose
to smoke, and argues strenuously that its advertising in no way targets minors,
though it is often geared towards the young adult smoker. 242 The reason
why tobacco products are so heavily advertised is that the tobacco industry is
well-recognized as one of the most ercely competitive market categories. 243
Second, the tobacco lobby maintains that the FDA's data simply
does not establish a causal connection between tobacco advertising and a minor's
decision to begin smoking.244 It argues that the very language the FDA uses
in describing its conclusions{hypothesis, Important contributory role, evidence
suggests{ is an acknowledgment that no causal link has been proven. Further,
the industry notes that even the FDA concedes that '[m]any behavioral and
personal characteristics inuence an adolescent's decision to use cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco products' and that advertising and promotional activities at
most, merely 'contribute to the multiple and convergent psychological inuences
242Leo Burnett, supra note 33, at 4, 27.
243Id. at 6. Leo Burnett even makes the clever, if unsubstantiated, claim that restricting
tobacco advertising will do nothing more than make a tobacco product a 'forbidden fruit,'
thereby rendering it more attractive to rebellious-minded teenagers. Id. at II.
244Leo Burnett argues that advertising theory explains the lack of causation. Leo Burnett
explains restricting or banning advertising will not aect the incidence of children smoking
because [ii t's not a~s~ of brand names that cause trial and usage of products in a mature
market, which Leo Burnett claims the tobacco market to be. Id. at 10-11. The decision
to make a category purchase within a mature product category is ALREADY made before
advertising aects the brand choice within the category. Id. at 6. A mature market is one
that ceases to evolve very much{ the market stage where advertising functions to merely shift
customers from one brand to another, but does not act as a stimulus to new customers to
enter the market. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). See also ANA, supra note 188, at 29 (The
FDA Misunderstands the Role and Function of Advertising in a Mature Market.)
57that lead children and youths to begin using these products.' 245 As Dr. J.J.
Boddewyn argues, the studies favorably cited [by the FDA] are really about
associations between cigarette advertising and smoking behavior rather than
about causality. 246 Noting the similar conclusions of ocial investigations
conducted in this country and around the world,247 Dr. Boddewyn contends
that the evidence simply does not demonstrate a causal connection between
tobacco advertising the prevalence of youth smoking. Particularly damning to
the FDA is the conclusion of a 1989 report compiled by then-Surgeon General
Koop:
[t]here is no scientically rigorous study available to the public,
that provides a denitive answer to the basic question of whether advertising
and promotion increase the level of tobacco consumption... The extent of the
inuence of advertising and promotion is unknown and possibly unknowable.248
245Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 26-27 (quoting FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at
41,329-30). The lobby argues that the decision to begin smoking is inuenced by numerous
factors, but predominantly by family and friends. Bork, supra note 190, at 5. See also Leo
Burnett, supra note 33, at 35.
246J~J~ Boddewyn, Ph.D. Preface to 'Cigarette Advertising Bans and Smoking: The Flawed
Policy Connection,' iNTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ADVERTISING, 1994, 13(4), 311-
332, 3 (emphasis in original) (hereinafter Boddewyn); see also Bork, supra note 190, at 18
(FDA has confused correlation with causality).
247Boddewyn stresses two recently completed ocial investigations in particular. A 1990
Report of the Standing Committee on Legislation of the Western Australian Parliament con-
cluded that
[ajfter receiving evidence from people eminent in relevant elds of research, the Com-
mittee is forced to the conclusion that no compelling evidence has been presented that adver-
tising causes people. and in particular young people, to begin smoking. The strongest case
presented to the Committee suggests that a mix of personal and social factors acting together
causes young people to experiment with smoking. Among young people at risk, advertising
might well be inuential in their decision, particularly regarding the brands they choose. How-
ever, advertising in isolation from all other factors shaping young people's lives has not been
shown to be a primary cause in their decision to begin smoking.
Id. at 2. Boddewyn also cites the 1995 Supreme Court of Canada decision invali-
dating Canada's ban on cigarette advertising, which held that [alt this point, [there is noti a
clearly understood causal connection between advertising, or any other environmental factor,
and tobacco consumption. Id. (citing 1995 SCJ No. 68, 21 September 1995. p. 54).
248Dept. Health and Human Services. Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25
Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General. Oce of Smoking and Health 512
58Even more persuasive are the results of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's comprehensive three-year investigation of the Joe Camel campaign, which
concluded [a]fter considering every possible avenue to a lawsuit to ban the ads
that although it may seem intuitive to some that the Joe Camel advertising
campaign would lead more children to smoke or lead children to smoke more,
the evidence to support that intuition is not there. 249 The tobacco industry
argues that the FTC's conclusion, reached only after
'spend[ing] a great deal of time and eort reviewing the dicult
factual and legal questions raised by t[he] case, including a comprehensive review
of the relevant studies and statistics,'250 should carry a great deal of weight.
Finally, the tobacco lobby challenges the FDA's conclusion that ad-
vertising restrictions would reduce to a material degree the incidence of tobacco
use by minors.251 The industry points to the experience of countries where
cigarette advertising has been either severely restricted or totally banned. In
Finland and Norway, for example, where ads have been banned since 1978 and
1975 respectively, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged from the
pre-ban period.252 In Australia and Sweden, countries with more recent bans,
(1989)(cired at Boddewyn, supra note 245, at 2). The tobacco industry argues that the
studies relied upon by the FDA itself fail to conclude the existence of a causal relationship.
Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 30 and n.29.
249R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., FTC Release (statement of Commissioners Azcuenaga, Owen
and Starek), reprinted in Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 27-28 (If intuition and concern
for children's health were a sucient basis under the law for bringing a case, we have no
doubt that a unanimous Commission would have taken that action long ago... Indeed, our
concern about the health of children led us to consider every possible avenue to a lawsuit
before reaching today's conclusion.).
250Id.
251See, e.g., Tobacco Industry, supra now 215, at 33-34; ANA, supra note 188, at 28-29;
Boddewyn, supra note 245, at 8-9;
252Boddewyn, supra note 245, at 10-11; ANA, supra note 188, at 29.
59smoking rates have actually risen in the past few years.253 c.Does Rubin mean
what it says?
The evidence presented by the tobacco lobby thus casts severe
doubt on the constitutionality of the proposal. The FDA can argue that its
proposed regulations are supported by far more evidence than the restrictions
overturned in Edenekl254 and Rubin.255 Indeed, the FDA's supporting data
may most resemble the evidentiary record in Florida Bar, where the Court held a
106 page summary of a 2 year study, containing statistical data and an anecdotal
record noteworthy for its breadth and detail sucient to meet the government's
burden under Central Hudson's third-prong.256 Yet the tobacco lobby can dis-
tinguish Florida Bar on the critical grounds that the supporting data at issue
there was at no time refuted, which is hardly true in the present case.257 The
industry's primary argument, however, should be that if the Court's language in
Rubin means what it says{ a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree{ the FDA's
proposal does not satisfy Central Hudson's third prong.
This argument is persuasive. The FDA convincingly establishes
253Boddewyn, supra note 245, at 10.
254113 5. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (holding that government presented no studies or anecdotal
evidence that suggest that the restricted expression createld] the dangers intended to be
alleviated).
255115 5. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1995)(holding that government submitted anecdotal evidence and
educated guesses but failed to present any credible evidence that the restricted expression
caused the harms complained ot).
256115 5. Ct. 2371, 2377-78 (1995). The Florida Bar majority noted that it did not read our
case law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background
information. Id. at 2378.
257Id.
60some link{ be it a correlation or causation or association{ between tobacco ad-
vertising and tobacco use by minors. The argument that such advertising causes
kids to begin using tobacco products is severely undercut, however, by (1) the
conclusions of the Surgeon General, the FTC, and several ocial investigations
conducted abroad and, to a lesser extent, (2) by the language the FDA uses to
describe the very studies it relies on. Further, the experiences of other countries
that have enacted similar restrictions or all-out bans sharply contradict FDA's
argument that its proposed restrictions will eectively reduce tobacco use to a
material degree.
Thus, the FDA's best chance is to hope that the Fourth Circuit is
right in believing that the Court did not mean what it said in Rubin. The FDA
can cling to its deferential strain of case law in the hopes that no court would
really require it to prove what, at this moment, cannot be proven. Based on
the history of the commercial speech doctrine, the FDA cannot be blamed for
trying.
4.Is the FDA proposal suciently narrowly tailored?
Once again, inconsistent Supreme Court precedent creates uncer-
tainty as to the appropriate test under this Central Hudson prong. FDA argues
for the Fox restatement of the rule:
What our decisions require is a 't between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,'...- a t that is not neces-
sarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,'.., that
61employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but... a means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to the
governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed.258
As with the third prong, the FDA argues, the Supreme Court has
expressed a willingness to defer this determination to the regulating body. 259
Here again, the Fourth Circuit cases demonstrate the continuing vitality of
the deferential strain of the case law. The circuit court applied the following
standard to the restrictions on alcohol and tobacco outdoor advertising at issue
in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch:
If there were some less restrictive means of screening outdoor adver-
tising from minors, or of reducing the area of billboard regulation in a manner
that would have it focus more eectively on reaching minors, the City would
have to consider those alternatives. But it is not an acceptable response to the
approach taken by the City of limiting advertising exposure to say that the City
must abandon altogether an approach that directly advances its goal. In the
face of a problem as signicant as that which the City seeks to address, the City
must be given some reasonable latitude.260
Needless to say, the Court held that the City acted within its rea-
sonable latitude to do so. The FDA should have little diculty satisfying the
Fox formulation of Central
Hudson's fourth prong, though not on the grounds actually argued
258FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
259Id. (citing Edge Broadcasting and numerous lower court decisions).
260Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1314; Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1325-26.
62in the proposal.261 The
FDA's fourth-prong analysis relies heavily on the discredited greater
power includes the lesser reasoning of Posadas.262 The agency argues, for exam-
ple, that because it could have banned the sale or distribution of the product,
or banned certain of the marketing and promotional practices of the tobacco
industry, the lesser steps of regulating... advertising.., are reasonable. 263 As
discussed supra part III.B.2.b., this reasoning should not be sucient to satisfy
the government's burden on this point.
Nonetheless, the t between the FDA's chosen means and its as-
serted ends should satisfy the deferential Fox standard. The FDA's proposal
represents a deliberate eort to prevent allegedly harmful advertising from
reaching children, while attempting not to suppress advertising that is either
harmless or is viewed primarily by adults.264 The tombstone ad regulation,
though possibly imperfect by the FDA's own admission,265 would reduce the
attraction and appeal of tobacco advertising for minors while still providing
useful information to consumers legally able to purchase these products. 266
The proposed ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of schools or play-
grounds singles out those places where children and adolescents spend a great
261See FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355.
262See supra part III.B.2.b.
263FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355.
264The FDA argues that because the evidence would support a complete prohibition of
tobacco advertising, the limited restrictions proposed should be upheld. Id. A court seems
unlikely to give much weight to this bit of circular reasoning, and would probably simply
evaluate whether the evidence supports the regulations actually proposed.
265See FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,335 (Recognizing that it is dicult to draw the
line between advertising that should be restricted or regulated and advertising that does not
pose an unreasonable risk of inuencing young people, the agency requests comment on the
appropriateness of the proposed regulations and whether other alternatives would be more
appropriate or eective.)
266Id.
63deal of time, and is merely an expansion of the 500 foot limit that is already
part of the tobacco industry's voluntary Cigarette Advertising and Promotion
Code. 267 The complete prohibition of all promotional non-tobacco items and
brand sponsorship of events is clearly the least tailored of the proposed adver-
tising restrictions. Because the FDA made no eort to distinguish those items
and events that appeal to minors from those that do not, this restriction may
be vulnerable to attack even under the Fox standard. Still, Public Citizen ar-
gues that FDA 's line-drawing, at least as to the event sponsorship provision,
is eminently reasonable... [in that it] allow[s] tobacco companies to continue
to sponsor events and therefore reap the corporate good will that ows from
sponsorship, but compels the companies to jettison the hard-sell message that
now typies these events. 268 In the end, however, a court that chooses to
apply the more deferential standard has probably already decided to uphold
the restriction at issue, unless it is substantially excessive or disregards 'far less
restrictive and more precise means.'269 A court would almost certainly refuse
to so hold as to any of the proposed restrictions.
The tobacco lobby contends, however, that FDA is seriously con-
fused over its fourth prong responsibilities, 270 and argues for the more speech-
protective application of Central Hudson's nal prong. The industry maintains
that a government restriction of commercial speech must be narrowly tailored
267Id. at 41,334-335. The FDA can also point to Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981), as an example of the Court1s deference to billboard regulations.
268Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 133.
269Fox, 492 U.S. at 479 (citation omitted). Florida Bar is also persuasive authority for the
proposition that a concededly over-inclusive restriction of commercial speech may still satisfy
the fourth prong, though the regulation at issue there was only temporary. 115 S. Ct. at
2380.
270ANA, supra note 188, at 21.
64and its costs carefully calculated to accomplish its asserted purpose.271 Cit-
ing Discovety Network and Rubin, the industry asserts that [r]egulations which
disregard far less restrictive means and more precise means of achieving the gov-
ernment's asserted objectives are not narrowly tailored.272 The tobacco lobby
alleges that FDA fails to satisfy its fourth prong burdens because (1) alternative
approaches would accomplish the FDA' s asserted interests far more eectively
without burdening any speech, and (2) its regulations sweep far too broadly,
restricting expression to adults in the name of protecting children.
The tobacco lobby argues vigorously that two obvious alternatives
would entail no restriction of speech whatsoever. First, the federal government
should simply intensify law enforcement eorts, either by enacting federal laws
prohibiting the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors or merely
supporting state eorts that do the same. Through better enforcement of cur-
rent laws and stier penalties for oenders, child access laws can have a signi-
cant direct impact without burdening speech at all.273 FDA itself is fully aware
that [y]outh access restrictions have been found to be eective in reducing illegal
sales and... that eorts to reduce access have led to a decrease in tobacco use
by young people. 274 In fact, Subpart B of the FDA proposal includes measures
intended to toughen law enforcement eorts across the country.
A second obvious alternative is for FDA to step up its own edu-
271Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 34.
272Id.
273Id. at 35.
274FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,322. Evidence suggests that state laws prohibiting
sales to minors are not vigorously enforced. One study cited by the ANA, supra note 188, at
47, reports that 67 percent of minors with an average age of 15 were asked no questions when
they attempted to purchase cigarettes.
65cation eorts{ to use counter-speech to combat the tobacco industry's speech.
Here again FDA acknowledges the ecacy of such public education campaigns
by proposing to require the industry to establish and fund one. While this pro-
posal is almost certainty unconstitutional, as demonstrated supra part IV.A.,
nothing prevents the government from designing and funding one of its own.
In fact, the ANA notes that Congress has already directed the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.., to 'establish and carry out a program to inform
the public of any danger to human health' presented by the use of cigarettes or
smokeless tobacco products. 275
The tobacco lobby argues further that the proposed restrictions
are not suciently tailored to their purported goal of protecting minors. The
industry charges FDA with violating the principle enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Butler v. Michigan precluding governments from reduc[ing] the adult
population... to reading only what is t for children. 276 In a methodical rule-
by-rule analysis, the industry demonstrates how each proposed regulation would
eectively bar cigarette advertising directed at adults. 277
Tombstone Ads. First, this proposed restriction would amount to a
total ban on tobacco advertising in the aected publications because the limited
value of this advertising means it would make no sense to place the ads at all.278
Second, as Robert Bork argues, the FDA provides no basis for having chosen the
275ANA, supra note 188, at 49 (citing 15 U.S.C. sections 1341, ~01).
276352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
74 (The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would
be suitable for a sandbox.).
277Tobacco lndustry, supra note 215, at 5.
278Id.
6685 percent gure. 279 A rule that restricts advertising in a newspaper whose
readership includes only 16 percent minors, or a national news magazine read
by 50 million people, two million one of whom happen to be under the age of
eighteen, is clearly anything but narrowly tailored. Moreover, those publications
that approach the two million or fteen percent thresholds, but do not always
cross them, would present constant diculties for publishers and manufacturers
alike, who often enter into multi-issue agreements and rely on the ability to plan
ahead.280 These implications raise the suspicion that [the FDA] is using minors
as a pretext to try to ban cigarette advertising generally. 281
Outdoor Advertising. The tobacco industry argues that the reg-
ulation prohibiting all outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of any playground
or school is equally and unnecessarily draconian. According to the industry's
comments to the FDA, such restrictions would ban outdoor advertising in 94.8
percent of Manhattan (88.4 percent if the regulation applied to schools only),
90 percent of Boston (82 percent if applied to schools only), and 87.7 percent
of Seattle (under a broad denition of 'playground').282
Promotional Items and Sponsorship. Robert Bork argues convinc-
ingly that the broad scope of these restrictions violate Central Hudson's fourth
prong.
Even if there was compelling evidence that sponsorship of certain
events or of certain merchandise increased underage smoking, the FDA has not
279Bork, supra note 190, at 24.
280ANA, supra note 188, at 44.
281Bork, supra note 190, at 24.
282Tobacco Industry, supra note 215, at 6-7. This data is presumably based on its own
computations as no source for these gures is cited.
67tailored its ban to those events or to those items that would have any particu-
lar appeal to children. Instead, brand-name tobacco sponsorship identication
is banned at all events and for all merchandise, regardless of their appeal to
children.
The scope of events regulated by FDA could not be broader. They
include any athletic, musical, artistic or other social or cultural event.' Such a
broad ban suggests that children may be a pretext for bans on brand name spon-
sorship identication for these events across the board rather than a justication
for a regulation narrowly designed to protect children.283
Prohibiting brand sponsorship in auto racing, for example, where
the FDA's own stats suggest that children constitute a mere seven percent of
the viewing audience,284 is to burn the house to roast the pig. 285
Thus, under the more speech-protective interpretation of Central
Hudson's fourth prong, the FDA's failure to tailor its restrictions more narrowly,
combined with the existence of two alternatives that burden no speech whatso-
ever, may render the proposal unconstitutional. One can argue that the FDA
calculated the costs of its restrictions as inadequately as the government did in
Discovery Network, where the Court struck down a local ordinance banning all
commercial newsracks on public property without regard to
size, shape, appearance, or number in the interest of preventing
visual blight. 286 Clearly the FDA could have proposed less burdensome re-
283Bork, supra note 190, at 19-20.
284Bork, supra note 190, at 20 (citing FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,337).
285Id. (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
286113 S. Ct. at 1510.
68strictions by distinguishing between events and items that appeal to children and
those that do not; by taking account not just of the distance between outdoor
advertising and playgrounds but also of the direction from which the advertis-
ing can actually be seen; by raising the 15 percent threshold and eliminating it
altogether for publications with smaller circulation. Further, the mere availabil-
ity of two non-speech burdening alternatives could in and of itself render the
plan unconstitutional, depending on how seriously one construes the Court's
dictum in Rubin that the availability of several alternatives indicates that [the
challenged regulation] is more extensive than necessary. 287
The FDA can respond that trying to protect children by restricting
advertising intended for both children and adults will necessarily involve some
imprecise line-drawing. No one approach can be perfect and, no matter what
the FDA proposes, inevitably the industry will quibble over the manner in which
the FDA drew the line. 288 Because this argument invariably leads to asking
for some degree of latitude, the FDA must argue that even the more restrictive
approach does not foreclose giving it any.
5.The Limits of the Central Hudson Test
The application of the Central Hudson four prong test to the FDA
proposal is profoundly unsatisfying. First, the unpredictability of the commer-
cial speech doctrine renders a clear legal analysis virtually impossible. This
frustrates students of the First Amendment, but must downright infuriate leg-
islators, manufacturers and advertisers who are left in the dark as to what
287115 5. Ct. at 1593 (listing three alternatives to the government's proposed scheme).
288Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 126.
69regulation is constitutionally permissible and what is not. A second source of
the discontent engendered by the Central Hudson analysis is the theoretical
uncertainty that underlies it. Contrasting rhetoric in the case law{ compare,
for example, commercial speech occupies a subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values with the free ow of commercial information is indis-
pensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system{ leaves
one with little sense as to what the First Amendment should permit. If the
First Amendment protects the marketplace of ideas, why should commercial
ideas be more easily suppressed than other kinds? Should only certain kinds of
commercial ideas receive less protection than others?
The next section explores the theoretical arguments for and against
the FDA's proposed restrictions of tobacco advertising. In the face of doctrinal
uncertainty, an analysis of the First Amendment concerns at stake sheds light
on the appropriate constitutional status of these rules.
C.The FDA Proposal and First Amendment Theory
As argued supra part III.B.2.b., the commercial/non-commercial
speech distinction is largely unprincipled. The asserted commonsense dier-
ences that explain why commercial speech receives a lesser degree of protection
collapse under analysis. The leveling and greater power aects the lesser justi-
cations, though never fully articulated by the Court, seem equally without basis
in First Amendment theory. While the FDA can make two additional arguments
that its proposed restrictions are consistent with First Amendment values, nei-
ther is persuasive. The First Amendment mandates that the government not
70pick and choose which expression gets to compete in the marketplace of ideas
without a sucient showing that the expression actually causes harm. The
government must not be permitted to restrict commercial speech more easily
simply because it deems the manner in which the speech proposes a transaction
insuciently informative or the transaction itself harmful. 289
Let us assume for present purposes what is an accurate description
of reality anyway, namely, that tobacco products pose undeniably grave risks
to our health and well-being, and that, though the evidence suggests some
correlation between advertising and the decision to begin using such products,
no causal link has been proven.
1.The FDA proposal restricts images, not information.
The proposed restrictions of tobacco advertising focus on image
rather than information. Requiring tombstone ads in those publications not
primarily read by adults, for example, prohibits R.J. Reynolds from using the
Joe Camel character allegedly so popular with children, but still permits it to
advertise the tar and nicotine content of its Camel cigarettes. Similarly, banning
brand sponsorship in auto racing, to take another example, has nothing to do
with suppressing information that might help consumers make rational decisions
about how to spend their money. Indeed, the very idea of such a ban is to
prohibit the emotional appeal of fast cars and rugged race car drivers. As a
289See Kozinski and Banner, supra note 1, at 752 (If all it takes to remove First Amendment
protection from a given kind of speech is that a suciently large nnmber of people nds the
speech less valuable than other kinds, we may as well not have a First Amendment at all.
Such an understanding of the First Amendment{ according to which speech not valued by a
majority receives no protection{ throws all speech regulation questions back into the political
arena.)
71Phillip Morris executive explained,
'We perceive Formula One and Indy Car racing as adding, if you
will, a modern-day dimension to the Marlboro Man. The image of Marlboro is
very rugged, individual, heroic. And so is this style of auto racing. From an
image standpoint, the t is good.'290
The Court, however, justies its protection of commercial expres-
sion primarily by reference to its informational value, the strong individual and
societal interests in free ow of commercial information. 291 The seminal Vir-
ginia Board case, for example, concerned drug price advertising that the Court
described as communicating the simple idea of I will sell you the X prescription
drug at the Y price. Subsequent cases have largely concerned the suppression
of expression that communicates some useful information, such as beer alcohol
content labeling,292 attorney solicitation,293 and contraceptive pamphlets.294
As Professors Collins and Skover note, the 'information function is central to
the Court's approval of commercial expression as a form of protected speech.
Indeed, of the major commercial speech cases in which governmental regulation
has been invalidated, nearly all 'involved restrictions on purely or predominantly
informational speech, such as the bans on price advertising.' By comparison,
governmental regulations were sustained in cases not involving predominantly
'informational advertising.
0295
290FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,337 (footnote omitted).
291425 U.S. at 763-64; see also supra part III.B.2.a.
292Rubin 115 5. Ct. 1585.
293See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Ibanez, 114 5. Ct. 2084.
294Bolger, 463 U.S. 60.
295Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 Tnx. L.
REv. 697, 730 (1993)(footnotes omitted).
72Thus, the FDA can argue that its restrictions have little to do with
why the First Amendment protects commercial expression in the rst place.
Eliminating Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man from the marketplace of ideas
will have no detrimental impact on consumers ability to make informed economic
decisions. In fact, such restrictions are designed precisely to encourage minors
to make rational decisions about whether or not to begin smoking{ and the
FDA surely believes that is what the industry fears most.
Professor Collins and Skover agree with the FDA. They characterize
much of today's commercial speech as having less to do with products than
lifestyles, less to do with facts than image, and less to do with reason than
romance. 296 Collins and Skover quote advertising executives who describe
their trade as concerning not 'products but a person and his life,' concentrating
'on the perceptions of the prospect.... [and n]ot the reality of the product.' 297
Insofar as advertising succeeds, the identity of the consumer is con-
tinually reshaped by a relationship to goods and services... 'We dierentiate
ourselves from other people by what we buy... In this process we become iden-
tied with the product that dierentiates us.'... Advertising displays the kinds
of cars we should own, the kinds of clothes we should wear, the kinds of alcohol
and soda we should drink, the kinds or perfumes and colognes we should use{
in short, the kinds of people we should be.298
Collins and Skover argue that such speech in the service of selling
is not entitled to the same degree of First Amendment protection as what they
296Id. at 708.
297Id. at 706 (footnotes omitted).
298Id. at 716 (footnotes omitted).
73call the (purely information based) classied model of advertising. Not only is
such speech valueless, they contend, but it actually debases the traditional First
Amendment values of rational decisionmaking and self-realization by transform-
ing the marketplace of ideas into a marketplace of commercial symbols. 299
Though Collins and Skover rightly argue that the commercial speech
doctrine does not account for the reality of modern advertising, this is no reason
to abandon First Amendment protection of such advertising altogether. Image-
based advertising does not express the type of idea described in Virginia Board,
but it expresses ideas nonetheless, indeed the very ideas described by Collins
and Skover in their critique. The notion that smoking will make you cool or
sexy, however frivolous and mundane in the FDA's eyes, should be subjected to
the rigors of the marketplace of ideas like any other. That the government dis-
agrees with or disapproves of this idea{ to the extent that it is actually able to
identify and articulate the idea that a particular image or slogan communicates-
is also no justication at all to suppress it. In fact, it is precisely the judgment
that the First Amendment prohibits governments from acting on.
The Court's holding in R.A. V. v. St. Paul300 is instructive on this
point. In R.A. V., the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting otherwise
unprotected hate speech on the grounds that the law suppressed hate speech
that espoused a particular point of view. The case has come to stand for the
proposition that even when the government is regulating a class of speech that
normally receives little or no First Amendment protection, the First Amend-
299id. at 698, 745 (Justice Blaclunun and his allies have ignored the dissonance between
today's commercial expression and the noble purposes of the First Amendment.)
300112 5. Ct. 2538 (1992).
74ment's strict neutrality standards, which render presumptively unconstitutional
discrimination based on content or viewpoint, still apply with full force.301
Just because the First Amendment requires the government not
to restrict express ion that seeks to inuence people's views of what is cool
does not mean that it may not try to do some inuencing of its own.302 The
neutrality principle only extends as far as make no law abridging. Nothing in
the First Amendment prohibits government-sponsored counterspeech, and, of
course, governments endorse and advocate ocial viewpoints on public health
issues, tobacco use included, all the time. In the Conclusion, I argue for the
approach that the First Amendment always counsels{ more speech.
2.Smoking is a harmful activity.
The FDA believes that tobacco advertising causes kids to begin
smoking. The FDA argues that studies that reveal a strong association but fail
to prove causation should nonetheless provide sucient support for its proposed
restrictions because the FDA should have broad latitude to regulate advertising
for socially harmful activities. This argument is invalid as a doctrinal matter
after Rubin, as we have seen, but does it carry more weight as a theoretical
justication?
This argument begins with the premise that the First Amendment
is not an absolute. The government may restrict speech that causes suciently
serious harm, as do libel and ghting words, so long as it can satisfy the high
301Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Ex-
pansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 788 (1993)(describing the
Supreme Court's holding in R.A.V.).
302See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)(upholding DHHS regulations which
limit the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities).
75burden of proving that the suppressed speech does in fact cause the harm com-
plained of. Speech that promotes illegality may be restricted, for example, only
if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and... is likely
to incite or produce such action.303 Thus, the constitutionality of the FDA's
proposal would be entirely justiable as a theoretical matter if the evidence as
to causation were unequivocal. The FDA's argument here is that, because kids
should not be smoking in the rst place, the FDA should be held to a lower
burden of proof as to causation and the somewhat ambiguous evidence should
be sucient.
The two dangers of this socially harmful activity argument are its
circularity and its serious potential for abuse. Allowing governments greater
latitude to regulate speech that concerns harmful activities simply encourages
would-be regulators to classify more activities as harmful. Thus, deferring to
restrictions of tobacco advertising because smoking is bad for you opens the
door for similar regulations of advertising for alcohol, coee, beef, and countless
other products that are not good for us.304 This rationale would most endanger
unpopular industries that opportunistic governments might target for political
gain{ indeed, some argue that this is the precise motivation of the regulations
at issue here.305 But those inclined to support the tobacco restrictions simply
because they loathe the tobacco industry must consider the implications of
303Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
304Leo Burnett, supra note 33, at 26, points to the example of Australia, where a government
ocial reassured advertisers that its newly enacted ban on tobacco advertising did not mean
that it would be 'alcohol and chocolates tomorrow.' One year after the tobacco ban became
law, the movement against alcohol advertising began. id. (footnote omitted).
305See comments of Thomas Lauria, assistant to the president of the Tobacco Institute,
reprinted in Bureau of National Aairs Health Care Daily, Oct. 19, 1995.
76this First Amendment be damned approach. Many supporters of this proposal
would be most unhappy to nd, for example, the same rationale adopted by
conservative governments to restrict contraceptive advertising on the grounds
that it causes people to engage in premarital sex.306
Thus, the argument that the degree of First Amendment protection
of speech that proposes a commercial transaction should correspond to the value
of that transaction to society undermines fundamental free speech principles.
Those sympathetic to the FDA's goals must not allow their opinions of the
tobacco industry or smoking generally to cloud their judgment.
V.CONCLUSION
A thorough analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the
FDA's proposed advertising restrictions reveals serious constitutional defects.
The public education campaign is a clearly impermissible attempt to compel
fully protected speech. And though inconsistent and unpredictable case law
precludes a clear assessment of the constitutionality of the remaining restric-
tions, a coherent theory of the First Amendment requires these rules to be
struck down as well.
Assuming the FDA does not lack the jurisdiction, it is not powerless
against the positive imagery that makes [tobacco products] so appealing to
children and adolescents.307 As the saying goes, the best defense is a good
306In Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 677 (1977), the Court held uncon-
stitutional a New York statute that prohibited the advertising and display of contraceptives, a
statute enacted, in part, because such advertising allegedly legitimia led] illicit sexual behavior
in the eyes of minors. The Court held that the speech in question failed the Brandenberg test
described supra pages 67-68. Id. at 701. A government seeking to enact a similar prohibition
could point out that Brandenberg was decided before Central Hudson, the test that would be
applied today and, if the FDA's reasoning is accepted, might permit such a ban.
307FDA Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,314.
77oense. If it is image, emotion, and appeals to the young's sense of live for the
moment that work with today's youth, than the FDA must use these tools to its
advantage. The FDA's public education campaign should stress not grim facts
and gures, however sobering these might be, but images depicting smoking
and cigarette use as uncool. How about a camel with a hacking cough? A race
car that sputters after just a few laps? A young boy unable to get a prom date
because he smokes or uses smokeless tobacco?
The First Amendment mandates that the government have ex-
tremely limited power to suppress speech because people can best decide for
themselves what is a good idea and what is not. If the FDA is so rmly con-
vinced that kids should not smoke, the burden is on it, and on all of us who
agree, to gure out ways to persuade others that we are right.
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